Since the defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact, the Supreme Court properly denied his motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers.
Delos-Santos v. Kaisman, NY Slip Op 07377 (2d Dep't December 31, 2025)
Extrinsic evidence may be considered in assessing the implied covenant claim, even if not relevant to the breach of contract claim.
AMF Trust Ventures, LLC v. 180 Group, LLC, NY Slip Op 00073 (1st Dep't January 8, 2026)
A defendant''s submission of an affirmation, instead of an affidavit, to present his reasonable excuse for not answering the complaint, was a mere technical procedural irregularity which can be disregarded, pursuant to CPLR 2001, 2101[f]. Plaintiffs waived any objection to the form of the submission by failing to return it within 15 days of receipt, pursuant to CPLR 2101[f]. To the extent that the defendant was required to cure the defect, he did so by ultimately serving an affidavit, which the court had discretion to accept pursuant to CPLR 2001.
S.G. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., NY Slip Op 00068 (1st Dep't January 8, 2026)
The doctrine of the law of the case seeks to prevent litigation of issues of law that have already been determined at an earlier stage of the proceeding. The doctrine applies only to legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision and to the same questions presented in the same case.
Cotto v. Robinson, NY Slip Op 07374 (2d Dep't December 31, 2025)
Plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint as of right, pursuant to CPLR 3025[a]. As such, Supreme Court correctly applied defendant's pending motion to dismiss to the amended complaint because the original complaint was superseded. The motion for leave to amend to remove two lines from the amended complaint that were included in error, filed within a week of the amended pleading, was providently granted, pursuant to CPLR 3025[b].
Daniel Szalkiewicz & Assoc., P.C. v. Liu, NY Slip Op 07346 (1st Dep't December 30, 2025)
On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. Claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity are insufficient to survive the motion. Dismissal is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery.
Byington v. North Sea Assoc., LLC, NY Slip Op 07372 (2d Dep't December 31, 2025)
The elements of a cause of action for defamation are (a) a false statement that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, (b) published without privilege or authorization to a third party, (c) amounting to fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and (d) either causing special harm or constituting defamation per se. A statement constitutes defamation per se if it tends to injure the plaintiff's trade, business, or profession.
Only statements alleging facts can be the subject of a defamation action because only facts are capable of being proven false, and falsity is a necessary element of defamation. In distinguishing between statements of fact and those of pure opinion, it is necessary to consider the writing as a whole, including its tone and apparent purpose, as well as the overall context of the publication, to determine whether the reasonable reader would have believed that the challenged statements were conveying facts about the plaintiff.
An expression of pure opinion is not actionable no matter how vituperative or unreasonable it may be. Where a statement of pure opinion implies that it is based upon undisclosed facts which justify the opinion, it is actionable because a reasonable listener or reader would infer that the speaker or writer knows certain facts, unknown to the audience, which support the opinion and are detrimental to the person toward whom the communication is directed. Where, however, the opinion recites the facts upon which it is based without implying the existence of additional, undisclosed facts, that statement is not actionable.
Biagini Realty v. Brightman, NY Slip Op 07371 (2d Dep't December 31, 2025)
The court may consider a motion to add a defendant even though the proposed additional defendant had not been served with a copy of the motion.
Acevedo v. 439 Realty Corp., NY Slip Op 07370 (2d Dep't December 31, 2025)
A corporation's by-laws constitute a contract between the corporation and its members. The members impliedly agree that the by-laws are determinative of the members' rights and status in relation to the corporation.
Matter of Min Wu v. Institute of Elec. and Elecs. Engrs. Inc., NY Slip Op 07347 (1st Dep't December 30, 2025)
A motion for leave to renew must be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination, and must offer a reasonable justification for the failure to present the new facts on the prior motion. The new or additional facts presented either must have not been known to the party seeking renewal or may, in the Supreme Court's discretion, be based on facts known to the party seeking renewal at the time of the original motion. While it is within the court's discretion to grant leave upon facts known to the moving party at the time of the prior motion, a motion for leave to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation.
Jesan Constr. Group, LLC v. Bedford Mer, LLC, NY Slip Op 07290 (2d Dep't December 24, 2025)