November 16, 2026

Suing a municipality

When a municipality has adopted a prior written notice law, the municipality cannot be held liable for a defect within the scope of the law absent the requisite written notice, unless an exception to the requirement applies. Where such a local law is in effect, prior written notice of a defective condition is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the municipality. To be entitled to summary judgment, the municipality must first establish that it lacked prior written notice of the alleged defect. Upon that showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to the rule: that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence, or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the locality.

Anderson vs. County of Suffolk, Inc., NY Slip Op 06676 (2d Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 15, 2026

Res judicata

The doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the reconsideration of claims actually litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding, as well as claims for different relief against the same party which arise out of the same factual grouping or transaction, and which should have or could have been resolved in the prior proceeding. Under New York's transactional approach to the rule, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy. Collateral estoppel is a narrower species of res judicata. It precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical; (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding; and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits. The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action or proceeding and is decisive of the present action or proceeding. The party against whom preclusion is sought bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination.

111 Heitz Pl., Inc. vs. Rodriguez, NY Slip Op 06675 (2d Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 14, 2026

Appellate practice

The Appellate Division declines to consider plaintiff's argument that defendant's motion to dismiss should have been denied as academic based on its amendment of the complaint. Plaintiff failed to raise the argument after defendant moved against the original complaint, and cannot be heard to complain after it charted its own course by amending it.

Iron Horse Credit, LLC vs. Wilner, NY Slip Op 06573 (1st Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 13, 2026

Contract law

When parties clearly express their intention that a subsequent agreement supersedes a prior one, the latter agreement controls. Thus, when the subsequent agreement contains an arbitration clause, the clause will apply to disputes predating the agreement that were not subject to arbitration.

Deshmukh vs. Kasowitz Benson Torres, LLP, NY Slip Op 06550 (1st Dep't November 10, 2026)

Here is the decision.

The indemnification claim was properly dismissed because the ndemnification provision is not unmistakably clear in its intention to include attorneys' fees in intra-party disputes. It is not enough that the provision is broad.

Invictus Global Mgt., LLC vs. Corbin Capital Partners, L.P., NY Slip Op 06572 (1st Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 12, 2026

A time-barred Article 78 petition

At issue is the judgment,  denominated an order, denying the petition to annul a determination of the Columbia University trustees denying petitioner's transfer application, and dismissing the proceeding brough pursuant to CPLR article 78. The petition is time-barred. The August 25, 2025 email from a Columbia University dean to petitioner stating that "admissions decisions are final" and "[t]here is no appeal process" was an unambiguously final decision as to petitioner's transfer application. Petitioner did not commence this proceeding until more than four months later, on December 30, 2025. Even assuming that another university official's earlier email suggested that an appeal was available, the August 25 email unequivocally foreclosed that possibility and put petitioner on notice that the limitations period had commenced. Petitioner did not demonstrate any fraud, misrepresentation, or deception that would justify the application of equitable estoppel.

Matter of Anonymous vs. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., NY Slip Op 06549 (1st Dep't November 10, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 10, 2026

Discovery

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for leave to seek disclosure of metadata, pursuant to CPLR 408). Petitioner failed to show unusual circumstances or ample need for the disclosing the metadata, as the documents submitted with the petition and cross-motion to dismiss were sufficient to determine the relevant issue.

Matter of Davis vs. Oddo, NY Slip Op 06522 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 9, 2026

A time-barred defamation claim.

Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's causes of action for defamation because they were barred by the one-year statute of limitations, pursuant to CPLR 215 [3]. The alleged defamatory statements were made in 2019 and plaintiff commenced this action in 2024, well outside the one-year limitations period. That plaintiff did not discover the alleged defamation until 2023 is not relevant because the limitations period begins to run upon publication.

The statute of limitations was not tolled due to equitable estoppel, as plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he reasonably relied on defendants' alleged deceptions and misrepresentations which in turn induced him to refrain from filing a timely action. This is so given plaintiff's separate ongoing litigation against these defendants and others, commenced in 2015, alleging fraud and misrepresentations. Thus, any claim that plaintiff relied on defendants' subsequent representations was not reasonable. Defendants also had no duty to disclose the purportedly offending documents. The 2015 action, which would have otherwise been in discovery, had been dismissed at the time that the statements were made and was not reinstated by this Court until well over a year later. Further, even upon reinstatement, plaintiff served no discovery demands in that action until 2024.

Brigham vs. Arnold, NY Slip Op 06520 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 8, 2026

Appellate practice

Plaintiff was not aggrieved by the court's order to compel, which was decided in her favor, and thus her cross-appeal therefrom is dismissed, pursuant to CPLR 5511. This is so even though she disagrees with the opinion supporting the order below. 

Anil vs. City of New York, NY Slip Op 06519 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 7, 2026

Attorneys' fees

The cause of action for attorneys' fees was properly dismissed because this claim is not recognized in New York as a separate cause of action. They are recoverable only as an element of contract damages.

Ahmed vs Choudhry, NY Slip Op 06518 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

November 6, 2026

Time to serve

 Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a plaintiff is required to serve the summons and complaint within 120 days after commencement of the action. If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon the defendant within that time, the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service. To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service.

If good cause for an extension is not established, the court must consider the broader interest of justice standard of CPLR 306-b. Under the interest of justice standard, the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to the defendant.

CPLR 308(5) vests a court with discretion to direct an alternative method for service of process when it has determined that the methods set forth in CPLR 308(1), (2), and (4) are impracticable. A plaintiff seeking to effect expedient service must make some showing that the other prescribed methods of service could not be made.

ARCPE 1, LLC vs. Canales, NY Slip Op 06405 (2d Dep't November 4, 2026)

Here is the decision.