Res judicata

The doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the reconsideration of claims actually litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding, as well as claims for different relief against the same party which arise out of the same factual grouping or transaction, and which should have or could have been resolved in the prior proceeding. Under New York's transactional approach to the rule, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy. Collateral estoppel is a narrower species of res judicata. It precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical; (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding; and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits. The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action or proceeding and is decisive of the present action or proceeding. The party against whom preclusion is sought bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination.

111 Heitz Pl., Inc. vs. Rodriguez, NY Slip Op 06675 (2d Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Appellate practice

The Appellate Division declines to consider plaintiff's argument that defendant's motion to dismiss should have been denied as academic based on its amendment of the complaint. Plaintiff failed to raise the argument after defendant moved against the original complaint, and cannot be heard to complain after it charted its own course by amending it.

Iron Horse Credit, LLC vs. Wilner, NY Slip Op 06573 (1st Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Contract law

When parties clearly express their intention that a subsequent agreement supersedes a prior one, the latter agreement controls. Thus, when the subsequent agreement contains an arbitration clause, the clause will apply to disputes predating the agreement that were not subject to arbitration.

Deshmukh vs. Kasowitz Benson Torres, LLP, NY Slip Op 06550 (1st Dep't November 10, 2026)

Here is the decision.

The indemnification claim was properly dismissed because the ndemnification provision is not unmistakably clear in its intention to include attorneys' fees in intra-party disputes. It is not enough that the provision is broad.

Invictus Global Mgt., LLC vs. Corbin Capital Partners, L.P., NY Slip Op 06572 (1st Dep't November 12, 2026)

Here is the decision.

A time-barred Article 78 petition

At issue is the judgment,  denominated an order, denying the petition to annul a determination of the Columbia University trustees denying petitioner's transfer application, and dismissing the proceeding brough pursuant to CPLR article 78. The petition is time-barred. The August 25, 2025 email from a Columbia University dean to petitioner stating that "admissions decisions are final" and "[t]here is no appeal process" was an unambiguously final decision as to petitioner's transfer application. Petitioner did not commence this proceeding until more than four months later, on December 30, 2025. Even assuming that another university official's earlier email suggested that an appeal was available, the August 25 email unequivocally foreclosed that possibility and put petitioner on notice that the limitations period had commenced. Petitioner did not demonstrate any fraud, misrepresentation, or deception that would justify the application of equitable estoppel.

Matter of Anonymous vs. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., NY Slip Op 06549 (1st Dep't November 10, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Court holiday

Discovery

Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for leave to seek disclosure of metadata, pursuant to CPLR 408). Petitioner failed to show unusual circumstances or ample need for the disclosing the metadata, as the documents submitted with the petition and cross-motion to dismiss were sufficient to determine the relevant issue.

Matter of Davis vs. Oddo, NY Slip Op 06522 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

A time-barred defamation claim.

Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's causes of action for defamation because they were barred by the one-year statute of limitations, pursuant to CPLR 215 [3]. The alleged defamatory statements were made in 2019 and plaintiff commenced this action in 2024, well outside the one-year limitations period. That plaintiff did not discover the alleged defamation until 2023 is not relevant because the limitations period begins to run upon publication.

The statute of limitations was not tolled due to equitable estoppel, as plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he reasonably relied on defendants' alleged deceptions and misrepresentations which in turn induced him to refrain from filing a timely action. This is so given plaintiff's separate ongoing litigation against these defendants and others, commenced in 2015, alleging fraud and misrepresentations. Thus, any claim that plaintiff relied on defendants' subsequent representations was not reasonable. Defendants also had no duty to disclose the purportedly offending documents. The 2015 action, which would have otherwise been in discovery, had been dismissed at the time that the statements were made and was not reinstated by this Court until well over a year later. Further, even upon reinstatement, plaintiff served no discovery demands in that action until 2024.

Brigham vs. Arnold, NY Slip Op 06520 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Appellate practice

Plaintiff was not aggrieved by the court's order to compel, which was decided in her favor, and thus her cross-appeal therefrom is dismissed, pursuant to CPLR 5511. This is so even though she disagrees with the opinion supporting the order below. 

Anil vs. City of New York, NY Slip Op 06519 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Attorneys' fees

The cause of action for attorneys' fees was properly dismissed because this claim is not recognized in New York as a separate cause of action. They are recoverable only as an element of contract damages.

Ahmed vs Choudhry, NY Slip Op 06518 (1st Dep't November 5, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Time to serve

 Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a plaintiff is required to serve the summons and complaint within 120 days after commencement of the action. If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon the defendant within that time, the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service. To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service.

If good cause for an extension is not established, the court must consider the broader interest of justice standard of CPLR 306-b. Under the interest of justice standard, the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to the defendant.

CPLR 308(5) vests a court with discretion to direct an alternative method for service of process when it has determined that the methods set forth in CPLR 308(1), (2), and (4) are impracticable. A plaintiff seeking to effect expedient service must make some showing that the other prescribed methods of service could not be made.

ARCPE 1, LLC vs. Canales, NY Slip Op 06405 (2d Dep't November 4, 2026)

Here is the decision.

Vacatur

Supreme Court providently denied defendant's motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), (a)(4) and in the interest of justice. The motion was not made within the one-year time period under CPLR 5015(a)(1). Moreover, defendant failed to provide any explanation for the default or an affidavit of merit as to its defenses. As the proposed answer was verified by an attorney without personal knowledge of the facts, it was insufficient to set forth a meritorious defense. As to CPLR 5015(a)(4), it was undisputed that plaintiff served the Secretary of State, and, thus, the court obtained jurisdiction even if those documents never reached defendant. Finally, defendant was not entitled to vacatur in the interest of justice.

Whitaker vs. 1975-1983 Jerome Ave. Corp., NY Slip Op 06398 (1st Dep't October 29, 2026)

Here is the decision.