Leave to renew ordinarily requires diligent efforts to obtain the evidence now relied on and a reasonable justification for not submitting the evidence in the prior motion, pursuant to CPLR 2221[e][2], [3]. Courts also may grant the motion in the interest of justice, so as not to defeat substantive fairness.
Forbes v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 04608 (1st Dep't August 7, 2025)
The Appellate Division declines to reach an issue that the appellant did not raise before the motion court and that is not a purely legal argument apparent on the face of the record.
Victor v. Khatskevich, NY Slip Op 04610 (1st Dep't August 7, 2025)
There is a "mere continuation" exception to the rule against successor liability on a contract claim. While no one factor is dispositive, courts determining whether a successor corporation is a mere continuation of its predecessor have considered whether: (1) all or substantially all assets are transferred to the successor corporation; (2) the predecessor corporation has been effectively extinguished following the transaction; (3) the successor has assumed an identical or nearly identical name; (4) the successor has retained one or more of the same corporate officers, directors, and/or employees; and (5) the successor has continued the same business.
Avamer 57 Fee LLC v. Hunter Boot USA LLC, NY Slip Op 04607 (1st Dep't August 7, 2025)
In order to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a special or privity-like relationship imposing a duty on the defendant to impart correct information to the plaintiff; (2) that the information was incorrect or withheld; and (3) reasonable reliance on the information or the omission. A conventional business relationship, without more, is insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship. A plaintiff must make a showing of special circumstances that transformed the business relationship to a fiduciary one, such as control by one party of the other for the good of the other.
Away Envtl., Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY Slip Op 04535 (2d Dep't August 6, 2025)
A residential lease that obligates a tenant to indemnify a landlord for the landlord's own negligence is unenforceable as against public policy. However, in a commercial lease, negotiated between two sophisticated parties, the lessor and lessee may freely enter into an agreement whereby they use insurance to allocate between themselves the risk of liability to third parties.
Arnold v. RJJR Corp., NY Slip Op 04534 (2d Dep't August 6, 2025)
Impleader is available even if the impleaded party owes no duty to the primary plaintiff, provided that the third-party claim is sufficiently related to the main action to at least raise the question of whether the third-party defendant may be liable to defendant-third-party plaintiff, for whatever reason, for the damages for which the latter may be liable to plaintiff.
A Real Advantage, Inc. v. Renu Constr. & Restoration, Inc., NY Slip Op 04531 (2d Dep't August 6, 2025)
A so-ordered stipulation is a binding contract that will be construed according to contract principles. As in the interpretation of any contract, the instrument must be read as a whole to determine the parties' purpose and intent, giving a practical interpretation to the language employed so that the parties' reasonable expectations are realized.
A Real Advantage, Inc. v. Renu Contr. & Restoration, Inc., NY Slip Op 04531 (2d Dep't August 6, 2025)
Contracting parties may agree to limit the period of time within which an action must be commenced to a period shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations. If it is in writing, the agreement is enforceable, absent proof that it is an adhesion contract or the product of overreaching.
95 Crescent, LLC v. Certified Restoration Servs., Inc., NY Slip Op 04530 (2d Dep't August 6, 2025)
A contractual obligation, standing alone, will not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party. However, a party that enters into a contract to render services assumes a duty of care and may be liable in tort to third persons, where (1) the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its duties, launches a force or instrument of harm, (2) the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's duties, or (3) the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely.
Bell v. Bollenbach & House, Inc., NY Slip Op 04453 (2d Dep't July 30, 2025)
CPLR 3101(a) broadly mandates full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. However, the court, sua sponte or on motion, may issue a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning, or regulating the use of any disclosure device. A party seeking a protective order must make a factual showing of unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice. The Supreme Court may issue a protective order precluding disclosure that is palpably improper in that it seeks irrelevant and/or confidential information, or is overly broad and burdensome. Although trial courts are vested with broad discretion to issue appropriate protective orders to limit discovery, that discretion must be exercised with the competing interests of the parties and the truth-finding goal of the discovery process in mind.
G.B. v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., NY Slip Op 04452 (2d Dep't July 30, 2025)
A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he was not at fault in the happening of the accident.
Almonte v. First Student, Inc., NY Slip Op 04450 (2d Dep't July 30, 2025)