Setting aside a prenuptial agreement.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the motion court's refusal to set aside the agreement, but on different grounds.  The defendant established that the parties' agreement, which is fair on its face, was not the product of fraud, duress, overreaching, or unconscionability. The plaintiff was represented by counsel of her choosing during the negotiation of the agreement.  Moreover, the agreement itself recites that the plaintiff had considered all of the facts and circumstances likely to influence her judgment, and that she entered into the agreement freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of its consequences. She was provided with meaningful bargained-for benefits. There is no evidence that the defendant attempted to conceal or misrepresent the nature or extent of his assets.  As the plaintiff entered into the agreement with the assistance and advice of her own attorney, she may not now complain that her interests were not adequately safeguarded.

Student note:  An agreement will not be set aside merely because, in hindsight, some of its provisions are improvident or even one-sided.

Case:  Barnes-Levitan v. Levitan, NY Slip Op 06768 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A client's dissatisfaction with a lawyer's strategic choice.

Contracts and ambiguity.

Practice Point:  The Appellate Division noted that the threshold question of whether a contract is unambiguous, and the subsequent construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contract, are issues of law.  The Appellate Division further noted that, when interpreting a contract, the court should arrive at a construction which will give fair meaning to all of the parties' language in order to reach a practical interpretation of the parties' expressions so that their reasonable expectations will be realized.  Extrinsic and parol evidence of the parties' intent may not be admitted to create ambiguity in a contract that is unambiguous on its face, but such evidence may be considered where a contract is determined to be ambiguous.

Student note:   If the contract's language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract will be considered ambiguous.

Case:  NRT N.Y., LLC v. Harding, NY Slip Op 06719 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:   Setting aside a prenuptial agreement.

Standing to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant-lawyer's motion for summary  judgment. The defendant was retained to create a trust and fund it with several insurance policies. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant allowed one of the policies to lapse due to nonpayment, and they commenced this legal malpractice action to recover the policy's face value. The defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), asserting, among other things, that the trustee plaintiffs lack legal standing.

The Appellate Division determined that the motion court correctly found that the trustee plaintiffs stand in a position analogous to that of an estate's personal representative, and, therefore, have the requisite privity, or a relationship sufficiently approaching privity, to maintain the action.

Student note:  Plaintiffs also raised a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of the continuous representation doctrine sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, pursuant to CPLR 203[a] and 214[6].

Case:  Ianiro v. Bachman, NY Slip Op 06709 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Contracts and ambiguity.

Dismissal of an appeal when the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party.

Practice point:  As the order appealed from granted relief to the third-party defendant, against the defendant's third-party plaintiffs, but not against the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not aggrieved by the order appealed from and her appeal must be dismissed.

Student note:  Pursuant to CPLR 5511, an aggrieved person is one who asks for relief but that relief is denied in whole or in part, or who opposes another person's request for relief which is granted in whole or in part.

Case:  Faicco v. Mr. Lucky's Pub, Inc., NY Slip Op 06707 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Standing to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Schools and a negligent supervision claim.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in this action where the infant plaintiff alleges that, when he was a seven-year-old second-grade student at a New York City public school, he suffered serious physical injuries as the result of an altercation in which a classmate caused him to strike his head against a bookcase.

The Appellate Division found no evidence that the school had notice that the plaintiff's classmate had a proclivity to engage in physically aggressive conduct. The evidence that plaintiff had complained to his teacher and others that the classmate was "picking on him" and calling him names, and that his mother had called the principal's office and reported that some unidentified boys were "picking on her son," when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, shows only that the school knew that the classmate had been picking on plaintiff verbally. Knowledge of such taunting, however, did not give the school sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of prior conduct similar to the unanticipated injury-causing act by the classmate.

Student note:  While schools have a duty to adequately supervise their students, and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision, unanticipated third-party acts causing injury upon a fellow student will generally not give rise to a school's liability in negligence absent actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct.

Case:  Emmanuel B. v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 06750 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Dismissal of an appeal when the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party.

Summary judgment on a 240(1) Labor Law claim.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division determined that plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim alleging injuries after he slipped and fell down the stairs of a temporary tower scaffold.

A plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on a 240(1) claim where, as here, stairs prove inadequate to shield him against harm resulting from the force of gravity, and his injuries are at least in part attributable to the defendants' failure to take mandated safety measures to protect him against an elevation-related risk.  Plaintiff's expert opined that the stairs showed obvious signs of longstanding use, wear and tear and that a decrease in anti-slip properties was to be expected.  Given that it is undisputed that the staircase, which was a safety device, malfunctioned or was inadequate to protect plaintiff against the risk of falling, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, whatever the weather conditions might have been.

The fact that the parties offered conflicting experts'  affidavits as to the adequacy and safety of the temporary stairs does not preclude summary judgment in plaintiff's favor.

Student note:  A fall down a temporary staircase is the type of elevation-related risk to which the statute applies, and the staircase, which had been erected to allow workers access to different levels of the worksite, is a safety device within the meaning of the statute.

Case:  O'Brien v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., NY Slip Op 06749 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Schools and a negligent supervision claim.

The emergency doctrine.

Practice point:  The doctrine holds that persons faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, not of their own making, that leaves them with little or no time for reflection or reasonably causes them to be so disturbed that they are compelled to make a quick decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, may not be held negligent if their actions are reasonable and prudent in the context of the emergency.

Here, the Appellate Division affirmed dismissal, noting that, in support of their motion, the defendants submitted the transcripts the deposition testimony of the injured plaintiff and of a nonparty witness. This testimony established that the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger had been traveling behind the tractor trailer driven by the defendant, in the same lane. The tractor trailer, with its full load of gravel in the 28-foot long attached dump trailer, weighed 102,000 pounds. The vehicle moved into the lane to the left of the tractor trailer, passed the tractor trailer, and attempted to move back into the lane of the tractor trailer in order to access an exit ramp on the right. The defendant testified that he first saw the vehicle as a "blur" to his left and three seconds later, despite slamming on his brakes, the tractor trailer made contact with the vehicle when the vehicle attempted to move into his lane. The nonparty witness testified that the vehicle suddenly crossed in front of the tractor trailer, creating a "risky" situation in which an accident was "imminent."  The Appellate Division found that this evidence was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the defendant was confronted with a sudden and unexpected circumstance not of his own making and that, under the circumstances, his actions were reasonable and prudent.

Student note:  As the affidavit of the plaintiffs' accident reconstruction expert was conclusory and speculative, it was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Case:  Bonforte v. M.K.'s Landscaping of Liberty, LLC, NY Slip Op 06702 (2d Dept. 2015)

Monday's issue:  Summary judgment on a 240(1) Labor Law claim.

CPLR 3216 and dismissal

Practice point:  Pursuant to the statute, a court may dismiss the complaint for want of prosecution only after the court has issued an order directing, or the defendant has served the plaintiff with a written notice demanding, that the plaintiff resume prosecution of the action and serve and file a note of issue within 90 days after receipt of the order or demand, and also stating that the failure to comply with the order or demand will serve as the basis for a motion to dismiss the action.

Student note:  Since CPLR 3216 is a legislative creation and not part of a court's inherent power, the failure to serve a written notice that conforms to the provisions of CPLR 3216 is the failure of a condition precedent to dismissal of the complaint.

Case:  Amos v. Southampton Hosp., NY Slip Op 06700 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  The emergency doctrine.

Go-karts and assumption of the risk.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the motion court and granted the defendant's summary judgment motion in this action where the plaintiff alleged injuries sustained when other go-karts bumped hers.  The Appellate Division applied the doctrine of assumption of the risk, determining that it cannot be reasonably suggested that contact between go-karts during a race is anything other than a commonly appreciated risk of go-karting.

Student note:  The Appellate Division noted that the defendant could not avoid liability based on the written waiver it asks its customers to sign.

Case:  Garnett v. Strike Holdings LLC, NY Slip Op 06694 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  CPLR 3216 and dismissal.

An allegation of false arrest or imprisonment, and the defense of probable cause.

Practice point:  Where the arrest is made without a warrant, the existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim.  Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.

Student note:  To prevail on a cause of action alleging false arrest or false imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove (1) intentional confinement by the defendant, (2) of which the plaintiff was aware, (3) to which the plaintiff did not consent, and (4) which was not otherwise privileged.

Case:  Nolasco v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 06663 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Go-karts and assumption of the risk.

Court Holiday

 

Tomorrow's issue:  An allegation of false arrest or imprisonment, and the defense of probable cause.