A Court of Claims determination in a nonjury trial.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal of this action in which claimant allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell while walking down a path at the Stony Brook University Hospital.

The injured claimant, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this claim against the defendant, State of New York, as the owner of the property. The claim proceeded to a nonjury trial on the issue of liability, after which a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant and against the claimants, dismissing the claim.

The Appellate Division found that the Court of Claims' determination that claimants failed to establish the existence of a dangerous condition created by the defendant which caused ice to form on the subject path was warranted by the facts and, thus, will not be disturbed. Claimants failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the placement of a pipe at the base of a retaining wall next to the path proximately caused the accident. While the claimant testified at trial that he observed water coming from the pipe and flowing onto the entire width of the path after he fell, he was confronted with his deposition testimony to the contrary. Where the trial court's findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses, deference is owed to the trial court's credibility determinations.

 In addition, claimants introduced into evidence photographs of the accident site which demonstrated that the path and the pipe were located on opposite sides of the retaining wall, at least 12 inches away from each other. Further, claimants submitted no testimony as to the amount of water which allegedly flowed from the pipe so as to cause ice to form across the entire width of the bottom of the path, and claimants' experts' opinion with respect to this theory of liability was speculative.

Student note:  In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the Appellate Division's power is as broad as that of the trial court.  It may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.

Case:  Fernandez v. State of New York, NY Slip Op 05638 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Fraudulent inducement and contracts.

Unlawful termination because of disability.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant hospital's summary judgment motion, finding issues of fact as to whether the hospital unlawfully terminated petitioner's employment because of her disability. There is evidence in the record that plaintiff was suffering from a mental illness that was affecting her job performance before the hospital terminated her employment. There is also evidence that hospital employees, including plaintiff's supervisor, were aware of her physical and mental health issues before she took medical leave, and that her supervisor was concerned about her fitness to work upon her return.

Student note:  Plaintiff is not estopped from asserting her discrimination claims under the State and City Human Rights Laws. Her application for, and receipt of, federal and state disability benefits is not inconsistent with her claims. In addition, the hospital has not established, as a matter of law, that plaintiff could not have performed her job duties with a reasonable accommodation.

Case:  Duckett v. New York Presbyt. Hosp., NY Slip Op 05769 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: A Court of Claims determination in a non-jury trial.

Leave to enter a default judgment.

Practice point:  Defendants failed to answer or appear, and plaintiff moved, in effect, for leave to enter a default judgement as against the individual defendant, pursuant CPLR 3215. The motion court denied the unopposed motion on the ground that the plaintiff failed to supply an affidavit of facts demonstrating  liability. The Appellate Division reversed.

In support of his motion, plaintiff submitted proof of service of the summons and complaint and proof of the default. In addition, the Appellate Division found that plaintiff submitted sufficient confirmation of the facts by submitting, among other things, an affidavit of merit setting forth the facts constituting his claims.

Student note:  On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3215[f], the movant is required to submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of the defaulting party's default in answering or appearing. A defendant who has defaulted in appearing or answering will be deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that flow from them.

Case:  Boudine v. Goldmaker, Inc., NY Slip Op 05629 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Unlawful termination because of disability.

A double-parked vehicle and summary judgment as to liability.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability.

It is undisputed that plaintiff's vehicle was double-parked in the lane of travel, in violation of 34 RCNY 4-08(f)(1), when it was struck in the rear by defendants' vehicle. Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that her own negligence in double-parking in the traveling lane was not a proximate cause of the collision.

Student note:  The Appellate Division expressly rejected plaintiff's argument that her double-parked car merely furnished the condition or occasion for the collision, rather than constituting one of its proximate causes.  A reasonable factfinder could conclude that a rear-end collision is a foreseeable consequence of double-parking.

Case:  Pickett v. Verizon N.Y. Inc., NY Slip Op 05607 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Leave to enter a default judgment.

A minority shareholders' action.

Practice point:  The corporation's minority shareholders brought this action against the majority shareholders, officers, and directors, alleging among other things, that defendants improperly diverted corporate opportunities to other companies owned by them, excluding plaintiffs from those opportunities.

The Appellate Division reversed the motion court's dismissal. While the complaint fails to set forth with particularity plaintiffs' demand that the board commence an action against defendants, pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 626[c], the complaint adequately sets forth plaintiffs' reasons for not making a demand, also pursuant to § 626[c]. It alleges that defendants, as the corporation's sole directors, were self-interested in the challenged conduct because they received a personal benefit as the owners of the corporations to which they diverted corporate opportunities. In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendants, in their role as directors, ignored plaintiffs' earlier attempts to compel them to cease their alleged wrongdoing.

Student note:  The Appellate Division also found that it was inappropriate for the motion court to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action in light of the allegations that defendants, as directors, did not act in good faith.

Case:  Soho Snacks Inc. v. Frangioudakis, NY Slip Op 05603 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A double-parked vehicle and summary judgment as to liability.

Court Holiday.

Contracts and damages for lost profits.

Practice point:  Where a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for lost profits, those profits must be within the parties' contemplation at the time the contract was entered into. While they must be proven with reasonable certainty, damages resulting from the loss of future profits are often an approximation.

Student note:  To prevail on a cause of action alleging breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it sustained actual damages as a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's breach.

Case:  Family Operating Corp. v. Young Cab Corp., NY Slip Op 05437 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: A minority shareholders' action.

A fall on wet bus steps.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and dismissed this action in which plaintiff allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on the wet steps of defendant's bus as he was exiting its front door. At his deposition, plaintiff stated that it was snowing on the day of the accident, and that "lots of snow [had] accumulated everywhere."

The Appellate Division found that, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that it did not breach any duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances that existed at the time of the accident. Given the inclement weather conditions when the accident occurred, it would be unreasonable to expect defendant to constantly clean the bus steps.

Student note:  A common carrier is subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor, namely, reasonable care under all the circumstances of the particular case.

Case:  Batista v. MTA Bus Co., NY Slip Op 5430 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Contracts and damages for lost profits.

Attorneys' fees and expenses for frivolous conduct.

Practice point: The court is authorized to impose attorneys' fees and expenses upon a party for frivolous conduct that "asserts material factual statements that are false," pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c][3].

Student note:  Rule 130-1.1 does not require a full evidentiary hearing, but states that attorney's fees and costs may be awarded "after a reasonable opportunity to be heard," and that "[t]he form of the hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case," pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[d].

Case:  Martinez v. Carney, NY Slip Op 05573m(1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A fall on wet bus steps.

An action alleging discrimination because of disability.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment on this disability discrimination claim.  The Appellate Division noted that an employer has a duty to move forward to consider accommodation once the need for accommodation is known or requested, pursuant to NYCRR 466.11[j][4], and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and found that  plaintiff's responses to the notice of proposed termination could reasonably have been understood as a request for accommodation, which the Department of Correctional Services rejected by terminating plaintiff's employment based on her inability to return to work within the one year permitted under Civil Service Law § 71.

The Appellate Division concluded that defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they engaged in a good faith interactive process that assessed plaintiff's needs and the reasonableness of her requested accommodation.

Student note:  An employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim pursuant to Executive Law § 296 unless the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the employer duly considered the requested accommodation. The employer cannot present such a record if the employer has not engaged in interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of the employee's request.

Case:  Cohen v. State of New York, NY Slip Op 05147 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Attorneys' fees and expenses for frivolous conduct.

Auto accidents, stop signs, and right-of-way.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of plaintiff's summary judgment motion on liability in this action where plaintiff seeks damages for injuries sustained in an auto accident.Defendant testified that he stopped at an intersection, looked to the direction of oncoming traffic, and observed that plaintiff's vehicle was at a corner one block away. Defendant further testified that he began to move his vehicle because he believed that he had time to cross over the intersection, as plaintiff's vehicle was "at the other corner." He also testified that he blew his horn five seconds before the vehicles collided, and that the impact occurred between the front bumper of his vehicle and the front driver's side of plaintiff's vehicle.

There are issues of fact as to which driver entered the intersection first, which driver had the right-of-way, and whether plaintiff could have exercised reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Student note:  The fact that defendant's approach in the intersection was regulated by a stop sign and no traffic control devices regulated plaintiff's approach is not a basis for awarding plaintiff summary judgment. In addition, even if plaintiff had the right-of-way, she was still obliged to be vigilant for oncoming traffic.

Case:  Parris v. Gonzalez-Martinez, NY Slip Op 05104 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: An action alleging discrimination because of disability.