Personal jurisdiction.

While the ultimate burden of proof rests with the party asserting jurisdiction, a plaintiff, in opposing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), is required to make only make a prima facie showing that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Where the plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that discovery is necessary, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that there may be facts sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. On such a showing, the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, postpone resolution of the jurisdictional question, pursuant to CPLR 3211[d].

Abad v. Lorenzo, NY Slip Op 05426 (2d Dep't July 25, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Punitive damages.

A separate cause of action for punitive damages is not legally cognizable in New York, and a claim based solely on punitive damages must be dismissed.

Jean v. Chinitz, NY Slip Op 05521 (1st Dep't July 26, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Liability under the Labor Law.

By its express terms, § 240(1) applies to "contractors and owners and their agents." A party is deemed to be an owner or general contractor's agent when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done. For liability to attach, the defendant must have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury so that it could have avoided or corrected the unsafe condition. The determinative factor is whether the defendant had the right to exercise control over the work, not whether it actually exercised that right.

Cabrera v. Arrow Steel Window Corp., NY Slip Op 05275 (2d Dep't July 18, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Constructive notice of a dangerous condition.

A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on its property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and fix it.

Bennett v. Alleyne, NY Slip Op 05272 (2d Dep't July 18, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Appellate practice.

No appeal lies from an order or judgment entered upon the default of the appealing party, pursuant to CPLR 5511.

Alvarez v. Jawaid, NY Slip Op 05269 (2d Dep't July 18, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Discernible hazards.

A property owner has a nondelegable duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition, taking into account the forseeability of injury to others. Even if a hazard is discernible, the owner may be liable.  A plaintiff's awareness of a dangerous condition does not negate a duty to warn of the hazard, but only goes to the issue of comparative negligence.

Farrugia v. 1440 Broadway Assoc., NY Slip Op 05222 (1st Dep't July 12 2018)

Here is the decision.

Waiver of the issue of standing.

A plaintiff who fails to timely appear or answer waives the issue of standing, pursuant to CPLR 3211(e).

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Thompson, NY Slip Op 05403 (1st Dep't July 19, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Vacating a default.

Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), a defendant seeking vacatur on the ground of excusable default must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., NY Slip Op 05268 (2d Dep't July 18, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Joint trials.

When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before a court, the court, on a motion, may order a joint trial of any or all the matters in issue, pursuant to CPLR 602[a]. The determination of the motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.  Denial of the motion may be warranted where: (1) there are no common questions of law or fact;  (2) the actions involve dissimilar issues or disparate legal theories; (3) a joint trial would substantially prejudice an opposing party; or (4) there is a risk of confusing the jury or rendering the litigation unwieldy.

Cromwell v. CRP 482 Riverdale Ave., LLC, NY Slip Op 05137 (2d Dep't July 11, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Premises liability.

In a premises liability case, a defendant property owner who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the allegedly dangerous or defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of it. The defendant can also meet the burden by demonstrating, prima facie, that the plaintiff cannot identify the cause of the accident.

Burke v. Umbaca, NY Slip Op 05132 (2d Dep't July 11, 2018)

Here is the decision.

CPLR 3215(c), defaults, and dismissals.

CPLR 3215(c) states that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." It is not necessary for the plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year in order to avoid dismissal under the statute. If the plaintiff has initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year of the default, the statute is not a basis for dismissal.

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lucido, NY Slip Op 05130 (2d Dep't July 11, 2018)

Here is the decision.

A motion for leave to renew.

The motion must be based on new facts not offered on the earlier motion that would change the prior determination, and must set forth a reasonable justification for the failure to present the facts on the prior motion, pursuant to CPLR 2221[e][2], [3].

B & R Mech., Inc. v. Oak Ridge Hollow, LLC, NY Slip Op 05129 (2d Dep't July 11, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Liability for an independent contractor's negligence.

A principal is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor because, unlike the master-servant relationship, principals cannot control the manner in which independent contractors perform their work.

Sampedro v. Ellwood Realty, LLC, NY Slip Op 05120 (1st Dep't July 10, 2018)

Here is the decision.

A directed verdict in a medical malpractice case.

The court granted defendant-doctor's motion for a directed verdict, and dismissed the complaint, in this action where plaintiff's expert did not specifically opine as to whether defendant departed from a specific standard of accepted medical practice. The conduct at issue, which involved the implantation of a technologically challenging device, is not within the knowledge of a lay jury. Neither, in the absence of expert testimony, could the jury discern whether this was a known risk or negligence.

Tropeano v Sandhu, NY Slip Op 04967 (1st Dep't Jun 5, 2018)

Here is the decision.

An improper fee-sharing agreement.

Judiciary Law § 491[1] prohibits any person, partnership, or corporation from sharing an attorney's fee in consideration of having placed in the attorney's hands a claim or demand of any kind. Pursuant to § 491[2], a violation is punishable as a misdemeanor.  Here, under the purported fee-sharing agreement, the plaintiffs would provide the defendant attorneys with proprietary information regarding potential clients, investigate claims, interview potential plaintiffs, and otherwise assist with litigation. In exchange, the defendant attorneys would pay the plaintiffs 20% of their fee for each case. This agreement is illegal and unenforceable. The plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable relief, since the contract was criminal in nature and not merely prohibited by statute.

Ballan v Sirota, NY Slip Op 05014 (2d Dep't July 5, 2018)

Here is the decision.

An out-of-possession landlord's liability.

Snow or ice is not a significant structural or design defect for which an out-of-possession landlord may be held liable.

Fuentes-Gil v, Zear LLC, NY Slip Op 04964 (1st Dep't July 5, 2018)

Here is the decision. 

A dismissed unjust enrichment claim.

A valid and enforceable contract governing the subject matter at issue precludes recovery in quasi-contract for events arising out of that subject matter.

Lantau Holdings Ltd. v. General Pac. Group Ltd., NY Slip Op 04952 (1st Dep't July 3, 2018)

Here is the decision. 

Limitations period for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference, and unfair competition.

These causes of action allege injuries to property, and, pursuant to CPLR 214[4], they are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

CDx Labs., Inc. v. Zila, Inc., NY Slip Op 04692 (2d Dep't June 27, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Construction subcontracts.

Under New York law, clauses in a construction subcontract, incorporating prime contract clauses by reference, bind the subcontractor only as to the prime contract provisions relating to the scope, quality, character, and manner of the work to be performed by the subcontractor.

Naupari v. Murray, NY Slip Op 04945 (1st Dep't July 3, 2018)

Here is the decision.

Crossing guards and the City's liability.

Dismissal was granted as to the City in this action where the infant plaintiffs, on their way to school, were walking within the crosswalk when one of them was struck by a school bus owned by defendant-bus company and operated by defendant-bus driver. The City had assigned a crossing guard to assist children at the intersection, but the guard called out sick that morning.

In order to establish that the City voluntarily assumed a duty, a plaintiff must show: (1) an assumption by the City's agents, through promises or action, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the plaintiff; (2) knowledge on the part of the City's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the City's agents and the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiffs justifiable reliance.  Here, as a matter of law, the City had assumed no special duty as to the plaintiffs. There was no direct contact between the City's agents and the plaintiffs. The fact that the guard, when on duty, greeted the plaintiffs and they relied on the guard's instructions does not create a special duty.

Ivan D. v. Little Richie Bus Serv. Inc., NY Slip Op 04823 (1st Dep't June 28, 2018)

Here is the decision.

A viable malpractice claim.

Plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim as against successor firm and the prior firm. Successor counsel had the chance to protect plaintiff's rights by seeking discretionary leave, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), to serve a late notice of claim. Whether the motion would have succeeded is up to the trier of fact. Denying dismissal is not speculative, as the trial court will weigh the established factors in exercising its § 50-e(5) discretion. Prior counsel failed to serve a timely notice of claim as of right in the underlying personal injury action. Plaintiff has a viable claim in spite of the fact that the successor firm was substituted as counsel before the expiration of time to move to serve a late notice. The substitution will be deemed a superseding and intervening act severing malpractice liability only if it is determined that the motion to file a late claim would have been successful.

Liporace v. Neimark & Neimark, LLP, NY Slip Op 04668 (1st Dep't June 26, 2018)

Here is the decision.