January 9, 2008

Infant plaintiff was struck by a vehicle which suddenly accelerated while the driver was parking it. In a previous negligence action, brought against the owner and the driver, Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In deciding that motion, the court added that the driver's negligence was the "sole proximate cause" of infant plaintiff's injuries. The parties settled and an infant's compromise order was entered.

Two years later, infant plaintiff and his mother commenced this action against the dealership, asserting causes of action sounding in products liability and negligent repair. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the issue of liability was determined in the previous action, and said plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from asserting that anything other than that the driver's negligence caused the infant's injuries.

The Second Department reinstated the complaint, in Sneddon v. Koeppel Nissan, which was decided on December 26, 2007. Appellate Division noted that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits a party from relitigating an issue which was previously decided in a proceeding in which that party had a full and fair opportunity to fully litigate the identical issue. The key is that the issue must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding.

Here, said Appellate Division, the previous action found that the driver's negligence was a proximate cause of infant plaintiff's injury, to which infant plaintiff did not contribute. In this action, though, the issues are whether the alleged manufacturing defect or negligent repair of the vehicle were also proximate causes of infant plaintiff's injuries. The issues in the current action are discrete and not identical to those in the previous action, and so plaintiffs are not barred from litigating them.