The tort of libel arises from the publication of a statement which is both false and defamatory, and there is no cause of action if the words are not reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, according to the Second Department, in Klepetko v. Reisman, which was decided on June 12, 2007.

Plaintiff brought the action to recover damages for allegedly defamatory statements made in a daily newspaper column which stated, among other things, that plaintiff was "cowardly," an "idiotic menace," and that he lived with another middle-aged man, which the plaintiff alleges is an insinuation that he is a homosexual.

The court said that the opinions expressed in the column are not actionable because they are "pure opinions" supported by a recitation of facts on which they were based. At worst, said the court, they are no more than name-calling or a general insult, a type of epithet not to be taken literally and not injurious to plaintiff's reputation.

The court also said that a false imputation of homosexuality may be reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation but, here, "the statement that the plaintiff lived together with another middle-aged man does not readily connote a sexual relationship, particularly when viewed in the context of a column concerning irresponsible dog owners."