In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, the plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious cause of action. The court may accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse where there is a detailed and credible explanation. Mere neglect is not a reasonable excuse.
Bambrick v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 04617 (2d Dep't July 20, 2022)
Prroperty owners and parties in possession or control of real property have a duty to maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition. In moving for summary judgment, the defendant has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the alleged dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to have discovered and remedied it. There is no duty to protect or warn against conditions that are open and obvious and not inherently dangerous. Whether the condition is dangerous or defective depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a question of fact for the jury, precluding summary dismissal.
R.B. v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., NY Slip Op 04616 (2d Dep't July 20, 2022)
A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering a complaint, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a,) must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense. Whether there is a reasonable excuse for a default is a discretionary, sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits.
6 Crannell St., LLC v. Urban Green Equities, LLC, NY Slip Op 04613 (2d Dep't July 20, 2022)
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the hospital may be held vicariously liable for the negligence or malpractice of its employees acting within the scope of their employment, but not for negligent treatment provided by an independent physician, as when the physician is retained by the patient. However, the hospital may be vicariously liable for the treatment provided by an independent physician if the patient comes to the emergency room seeking treatment from the hospital and not from a particular physician of the plaintiff's choosing, or if the nonemployee physician acts as an agent of the hospital or the hospital exercises control over the physician.
Vargas v. Lee, NY Slip Op 04661 (2d Dep't July 20, 2022)
Pursuant to CPLR 3025(b), defendants may amend their answer to include a new defense "at any time by leave of court or by stipulation of all parties." The determination to permit or deny an amendment is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Leave should be granted where the amendment is neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit, and any delay in moving to amend does not prejudice or surprise the opposing party.
Siddiqui v. Smith, NY Slip Op 04660 (2d Dep't July 20, 2022)
The requisite elements of proof are a deviation or departure from accepted community standards of practice and evidence that the departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. On a motion for summary judgment, the defendant-doctor must make a prima facie showing that there was no departure from good and accepted medical practice, or that, if there was, the plaintiff was not injured thereby. In opposition, the plaintiff must submit evidentiary facts or materials to rebut the defendant's prima facie showing, demonstrating that there is a triable issue of fact. General and conclusory allegations of malpractice, unsupported by competent evidence tending to establish the elements of the claim, are insufficient to defeat the motion. In order not to be considered speculative or conclusory, expert opinions in opposition must address specific assertions made by the movant's experts, setting forth an explanation of the reasoning and relying on specifically cited evidence in the record.
Shirley v. Falkovsky, NY Slip Op 04659 (2d Dep't July 20, 2022)
A moving defendant cannot meet its prima facie burden by pointing to gaps or deficits in the plaintiff's case. Therefore, in order to prevail on the motion, the defendant must affirmatively prove that, as a matter of law, there was no causation.
Dyer v. Amchem Prods. Inc., NY Slip Op 04906 (1st Dep't July 19, 2022)
The action must be commenced within six years, pursuant to CPLR 213[4]. Where the mortgage debt is payable in installments, a separate cause of action accrues for each installment that is not paid, and the limitations period begins to run on the date that each installment becomes due. However, even where a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the limitations period begins to run on the entire debt. Acceleration of a mortgage debt requires some affirmative action evidencing the holder's election to take advantage of the accelerating provision. Here, since the defendant failed to produce any evidence that the mortgage debt had been accelerated, she failed to demonstrate that the complaint was time-barred as to the recovery of any payments due, or advances made, on or after October 13, 2012.
Citibank, N.A. v. Jones, NY Slip Op 04533 (2d Dep't July 13, 2022)
Primary jurisdiction regarding the applicability of the Workers' Compensation Law is vested in the Workers' Compensation Board, and the court cannot express its view on the matter pending the Board's determination as to its jurisdiction. Here, there is a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff was injured during the course of her employment, and so the court must refer the matter to the Workers' Compensation Board.
Chin v. Doherty Enters., NY Slip Op 04532 (2d Dep't July 13, 2022)
A motion to set aside a verdict and for a new trial in the interest of justice encompasses errors in the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence, mistakes in the charge, misconduct, newly discovered evidence, and surprise. In considering the motion, the trial judge must rely on his own common sense, experience and sense of fairness and decide whether substantial justice has been done and whether it is likely that the verdict has been affected.
Bhim v. Platz, NY Slip Op 04531 (2d Dep't July 13, 2022)
A fraud on the court involves wilful conduct that is deceitful and obstructionistic, and which injects into the judicial process misrepresentations and false information so serious that it undermines the integrity of the proceeding. In order to demonstrate fraud on the court, the nonoffending party must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the offending party has acted knowingly in an attempt to hinder the fact finder's fair adjudication of the case and his adversary's defense of the action. The fraudulent conduct may include proof of fabrication of evidence, perjury, and falsification of documents, and must concern issues that are central to the truth-finding process. Generally, an isolated incident of misconduct will not rise to the level of a fraud on the court. Here, defense counsel's misrepresentation of the subject trial testimony during his summation was inexcusably careless, but it did not constitute a fraud on the court. The Appellate Division notes that the alleged fraud occurred in the context of a summation, which does not constitute evidence.
Bhim v. Platz, NY Slip Op 04531 (2d Dep't July 13, 2022)