Workers Compensation as an exclusive remedy.

Practice point:  Plaintiff is a bus matron employed by a non-party, and she is seeking compensation for injuries that she sustained in an accident that occurred while she was working on a bus registered to the first corporate defendant and driven by the individual defendant. Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that plaintiff was a "special employee" of the first corporate defendant, so that her claims would be barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6).  They did not demonstrate that the first corporate defendant assumed exclusive control over plaintiff's work. In fact, their own witnesses testified that bus matrons were supervised by employees of another company, not by employees of the first corporate defendant. Defendants offered no evidence to support a finding that the second corporate defendant, allegedly liable as the school bus owner, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, was entitled to rely on the exclusivity bar of the Workers' Compensation Law.

Case:  Mohammed v. Kierzowski, NY Slip Op 07525 (1st Dep't October 26, 2017)

Here is the decision.

The return of an engagement ring.

Practice point: The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant's motion, made pursuant to CPLR 4401 at the the close of evidene, for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action for the return of the ring. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolving credibility issues in his favor, there was a rational process by which the trier of fact could find that, when  neither party was under an impediment to marry, the plaintiff gave the defendant the ring in contemplation of a marriage which did not occur. As such, the cause of action for the return of the engagement ring should not have been dismissed.

Case:  Bierman v. Limoncelli, NY Slip Op 07426 (2d Dep't October 25, 2017)

Here is the decision.

Law office failure as an excuse for default.

Practice point:  A party asserting law office failure must provide a detailed and credible explanation of the default.  Conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of law office failure are not sufficient.

Student note:  Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a), in order to vacate its default in appearing at a call of the compliance conference calendar, the plaintiff had to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action.

Case:  555 Prospect Assoc., LLC v. Greenwich Design & Dev. Group Corp.,  NY Slip Op 07423 (2d Dep't October 24, 2017)

Here is the decision.

A claim based on exposure to lead-based paint.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in this action seeking damages for injuries resulting from exposure to lead-based paint.  The record establishes that the building was constructed prior to 1960; that defendant knew that a child younger than six years of age lived in the apartment; and defendant had actual notice of a positive lead test that it failed to remediate and that resulted in a letter alerting it to the fact that the condition had not been addressed.  Defendant's expert's conclusion that the positive test was too remote in time to be reliable does not create a triable issue of fact.

Case:  Jocelyn C. v. Soundview Apts. Realty, LLC, NY Slip Op 07388 (1st Dep't October 24, 2017)

Here is the decision.

A duplicative claim of a breach of fiduciary duty.

Practice point:  Under New York law, conduct amounting to breach of a contractual obligation may also constitute the breach of a fiduciary duty which is independent of the contract.  Professionals, such as investment advisors, owe fiduciary duties to their clients, and may be subject to tort liability, as it is policy, not the parties' contract, that gives rise to the duty. Here, the breach of fiduciary duty claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claim, since the plaintiff is suing the defendant not as a professional advisor, but as a managing member of the investment firm, a relationship that is controlled by the firm's operating agreement.

Case:  Panattoni Dev. Co., Inc. v. Scout Fund 1-A, LP, NY Slip Op 07334 (1st Dep't October 19, 2017)

Here is the decision.

Default judgments in matrimonial actions.

Practice point:  While there is a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions, the defendant still must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1).  The motion must be made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry.

Case:  Dankenbrink v. Dankenbrink, NY Slip Op 07237 (2d Dep't October 18, 2017)

Here is the decision.

An insufficient § 1983 claim.

Practice point:   Neither the state nor its officials, acting in their official capacities, are "persons" within the meaning of the statute.

Case:  Stoner v. Atlantic Realty Apts., LLC, NY Slip Op 07329 (1st Dep't October 19, 2017)

Here is the decision. 

An enforceable personal guaranty.

Practice point:  While a personal guaranty must be in writing, it does not have to be notarized to make it legally binding on the parties.  Typographical errors do not render the guaranty unenforceable.  Where the only alleged mistake is in the reduction of the agreement to a writing, it is a scrivener's error, and, no matter how the error occurred, it may be corrected without reformation of the agreement.

Student note:  In the absence of a claim for reformation, the court may, as a matter of interpretation, carry out the parties' intentions by transposing, rejecting, or supplying words to make the meaning of the contract more clear.

Case:  82-90 Broadway Realty Corp. v. New York Supermarket, Inc., NY Slip Op 07233 (2d Dep't October 18, 2017)

Here is the decision.

A residential owner's liability for a sidewalk fall.

Practice point:  There is an exemption from personal iability for failure to maintain the sidewalk if the  property is a "one-, two- or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part, owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes," pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210[b].

While the statute does not expressly contain a primary residence requirement,  the term "owner occupied" generally is used to mean that the owner regularly occupies the property as a residence.  The legislative history shows that the exemption recognizes the inappropriateness of exposing small-property owners in residence, with limited resources, to exclusive liability regarding sidewalk maintenance and repair.

Student note:  The statute is to be strictly construed as creating liability in derogation of the common law.

Case:  Kalajian v. 320 E. 50th St. Realty Co., NY Slip Op 07225 (1st Dep't October 17, 2017)

Here is the decision.

CPLR 3126 and precluding evidence.

Practice point:  Before a court invokes the drastic remedy of precluding evidence, there must be a clear showing that the party's failure to comply with discovery demands or court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious. Willful and contumacious conduct may be inferred from a party's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, coupled with inadequate explanations for the failures to comply, or a failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time.

Student note:  The nature and degree of a penalty to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter generally left to the discretion of the Supreme Court.

Case:  Candela v. Kantor, NY Slip Op 07106 (2d Dep't October 11, 2017)

Here is the decision.

A motion for leave to renew.

Practice point:  The motion must be bsed on facts that were not offered on the prior motion and that would change the prior determination, pursuant to CPLR 2221[e][2].  Pursuant to [e][3], the movant movant must demonstrte a reasonable justification for not having presented these facts on the prior motion.

Student note:  While it may be within the court's discretion to grant leave to renew based on facts known to the moving party at the time of the prior motion, the motion is not a second chance given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation.

Case:  Byun Sik Chu v. Kerrigan, NY Slip Op 07105 (2d Dep't October 11, 2017)

Here is the decision.