The Appellate Division reversed, and dismissed the complaint, finding that defendants did not conduct activities in New York, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws and establishing personal jurisdiction. The telephone and email communications between the Latvian defendants and plaintiff's New York office, concerning a contemplated association in the acquisition of a Latvian bank, with no presence in New York, do not constitute the transaction of business in New York.
In addition, defendants never entered New York in connection with their dealings with plaintiff; the parties' electronic communications also ran between defendants and plaintiff's London office; plaintiff traveled to Latvia in connection with this matter; and, if the bank were acquired, the parties' contemplated association would be centered in Latvia.
Practice point: Even if New York had personal jurisdiction existed over defendants, the Appellate Division would dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, in view of Latvia's being the principal situs of the underlying transaction, the pendency in Latvia of an earlier-filed action between the same parties concerning this dispute, and the likely applicability of Latvian law under a grouping-of-contacts analysis.
Case: Ripplewood Advisors, LLC v. Callidus Capital SIA, NY Slip Op 05157 (1st Dep't June 22, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Precluding photos of an accident site.
July 10, 2017
July 7, 2017
Discovery sanctions.
In this action for attorneys' fees and costs, the Appellate Division affirmed the money judgment and the denial of the motion to vacate the dismissal.
The plaintiffs failed to comply with a so-ordered stipulation that the complaint would be dismissed unless the plaintiffs responded to the defendants' demand for interrogatories and notice for discovery and inspection that had been outstanding for more than two years, despite several court orders directing a response. Upon the plaintiffs' failure to comply, the conditional order became final and a judgment was entered dismissing the complaint.
Case: 150 Centreville, LLC v. Lin Assoc. Architects, P.C., NY Slip Op 05056 (2d Dep't June 21 2017)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs failed to comply with a so-ordered stipulation that the complaint would be dismissed unless the plaintiffs responded to the defendants' demand for interrogatories and notice for discovery and inspection that had been outstanding for more than two years, despite several court orders directing a response. Upon the plaintiffs' failure to comply, the conditional order became final and a judgment was entered dismissing the complaint.
Case: 150 Centreville, LLC v. Lin Assoc. Architects, P.C., NY Slip Op 05056 (2d Dep't June 21 2017)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
July 6, 2017
Claims for prima facie tort and tortious interference.
Practice point: It is well settled that prima facie tort is not designed to provide a catch-all alternative for every cause of action that cannot otherwise stand on its own. A tortious interference claim will fail where plaintiff was not a party to any contract with a third party, or where plaintiff does not identify any damages apart from those for which he already has been compensated.
Case: Britt v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 05154 (1st Dep't June 22, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Discovery sanctions.
Case: Britt v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 05154 (1st Dep't June 22, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Discovery sanctions.
July 5, 2017
A fall at work.
The Appellate Division affirmed denial of defendant's motion for dismissal in this action where the plaintiff, a school employee, alleges that, while walking in a hallway, she slipped and fell on water after the floor had been mopped by a nonparty employee of the defendant.
The Appellate Division found that plaintiff's affidavit presents a triable issue of fact as to whether a there was a special employee relationship between the school and the nonparty employee. Plaintiff set forth that no one from the school supervised his work or directed his daily schedule, and that the school did not provide him with equipment or a uniform.
Practice point: The motion court properly considered plaintiff's affidavit, as it did not contradict her deposition testimony. In addition, plaintiff's deposition testimony and affidavit provide a non-speculative basis for her account of the accident, and sufficiently demonstrates a nexus between the hazardous condition and the circumstances of her fall, because she testified that immediately after she fell she saw that the floor was wet and that nearby there was a janitor's cart with wet floor signs attached to it.
Case: Cartagena v. Access Staffing, LLC, NY Slip Op 05025 (1st Dep't June 20, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Claims for prima facie tort and tortious interference.
The Appellate Division found that plaintiff's affidavit presents a triable issue of fact as to whether a there was a special employee relationship between the school and the nonparty employee. Plaintiff set forth that no one from the school supervised his work or directed his daily schedule, and that the school did not provide him with equipment or a uniform.
Practice point: The motion court properly considered plaintiff's affidavit, as it did not contradict her deposition testimony. In addition, plaintiff's deposition testimony and affidavit provide a non-speculative basis for her account of the accident, and sufficiently demonstrates a nexus between the hazardous condition and the circumstances of her fall, because she testified that immediately after she fell she saw that the floor was wet and that nearby there was a janitor's cart with wet floor signs attached to it.
Case: Cartagena v. Access Staffing, LLC, NY Slip Op 05025 (1st Dep't June 20, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Claims for prima facie tort and tortious interference.
July 4, 2017
July 3, 2017
A fall in the laundry room.
The Appellate Division reversed, and dismissed the complaint as against building owner-defendant in this action where plaintiff's decedent allegedly slipped and fell on a puddle of water
in the laundry room of his apartment building. The decedent was deposed before he died. He testified that,
as was his custom, on the day of the incident he went to the laundry
room twice in the early morning hours. The first time, when he went to load some wet clothes into a dryer, he did not see any water on the floor. No one else was there, and no other machines were in use. He left without incident, and then returned to remove
his clothes from the dryer. Again, no one else was there, and no machines were in use. The dryer had already come to a stop. He took his
clothes from the dryer, and as he took one step away from the dryer, he slipped and fell. After he fell, he saw, for
the first time, that there was water on the floor.
Practice point: In a slip-and-fall action, a defendant who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that it neither created the alleged hazardous condition nor had [actual or constructive notice of its existence. To provide constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it.
Here, the evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion, including the decedent's deposition testimony, was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the defendant did not create the alleged hazardous condition or have actual or constructive notice of it. A general awareness that the laundry room floor could become wet is legally insufficient to constitute constructive notice of the particular condition that allegedly caused the decedent to slip and fall.
Case: Adamson v. Radford Mgt. Assoc., LLC, NY Slip Op 05057 (2d Dep't June 2, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Wednesday's issue: A fall at work.
Practice point: In a slip-and-fall action, a defendant who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that it neither created the alleged hazardous condition nor had [actual or constructive notice of its existence. To provide constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it.
Here, the evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion, including the decedent's deposition testimony, was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the defendant did not create the alleged hazardous condition or have actual or constructive notice of it. A general awareness that the laundry room floor could become wet is legally insufficient to constitute constructive notice of the particular condition that allegedly caused the decedent to slip and fall.
Case: Adamson v. Radford Mgt. Assoc., LLC, NY Slip Op 05057 (2d Dep't June 2, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Wednesday's issue: A fall at work.
June 30, 2017
Spoilation of evidence.
Practice point: New York does not recognize spoilation of evidence as an independent tort.
Case: LaLima v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., NY Slip Op 04825 (1st Dep't June 14, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: A fall in the laundry room.
Case: LaLima v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., NY Slip Op 04825 (1st Dep't June 14, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: A fall in the laundry room.
June 29, 2017
Medical malpractice and the continuous treatment doctrine.
The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal as against defendant Health and Hospitals Corporation in this action where plaintiff alleges that defendants were negligent in failing to timely diagnose a cancerous wound. The motion court granted HHC's motion to dismiss the claims based on plaintiff's own conduct and his failure to file a timely notice of claim, in violation of General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(a).
Plaintiff was discharged from an HHC hospital in November 2010 and did not return to an HHC hospital for treatment until May 2012, when he received the cancer diagnosis. The notice of claim was filed shortly after plaintiff's discharge from the hospital in October 2012, more than 90 days after the claim's accrual in November 2010.
Practice point: The Appellate Division rejected plaintiff's contention that both the November 2010 and May 2012 visits were part of a continuous course of treatment, tolling the period for filing a notice of claim, pursuant to CPLR 214-a It is clear that, at the time of plaintiff's 2010 discharge, HHC anticipated that it would provide further treatment. However, it also is clear that plaintiff did not anticipate any further treatment by HHC. as, in the interim period, he began treatment by a co-defendant acupuncturist who plaintiff thought was a licensed physician. Plaintiff's actions indicated an intention to discontinue his relationship with HHC, and, therefore, his return visit must be deemed a renewal, rather than a continuation, of the physician-patient relationship.
Case: Jianfeng Jiang v. Xue Chao Wei, NY Slip Op 04896 (1st Dep't June 15, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Spoilation of evidence.
Plaintiff was discharged from an HHC hospital in November 2010 and did not return to an HHC hospital for treatment until May 2012, when he received the cancer diagnosis. The notice of claim was filed shortly after plaintiff's discharge from the hospital in October 2012, more than 90 days after the claim's accrual in November 2010.
Practice point: The Appellate Division rejected plaintiff's contention that both the November 2010 and May 2012 visits were part of a continuous course of treatment, tolling the period for filing a notice of claim, pursuant to CPLR 214-a It is clear that, at the time of plaintiff's 2010 discharge, HHC anticipated that it would provide further treatment. However, it also is clear that plaintiff did not anticipate any further treatment by HHC. as, in the interim period, he began treatment by a co-defendant acupuncturist who plaintiff thought was a licensed physician. Plaintiff's actions indicated an intention to discontinue his relationship with HHC, and, therefore, his return visit must be deemed a renewal, rather than a continuation, of the physician-patient relationship.
Case: Jianfeng Jiang v. Xue Chao Wei, NY Slip Op 04896 (1st Dep't June 15, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Spoilation of evidence.
June 28, 2017
Standing to sue a bank for the return of a check.
The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of this action where plaintiff asserts that he and a friend went together to his friend's bank, because he wanted to cash a check, and, due to his immigration status, he had no identification. The two signed their names in front of the teller, before sliding the check under the teller window, with a deposit slip that instructed to clear the funds into the friend's account. The bank rejected the deposit, closed the friend's account, and did not issue a replacement check until several months later.
Practice point: When plaintiff endorsed and delivered the check to his friend, the friend became the holder of the check, pursuant to NY UCC 3-202[1]. Thus, only the friend was entitled to negotiate the check or to enforce payment in his own name, pursuant to NY UCC 3-301[1]. Plaintiff's argument that he, as payee of the check, is entitled to enforce its return or payment is unavailing. Plaintiff lacks standing to sue the bank for the return or proceeds of the check, because he is no longer the holder of the check.
Case: Delight Bvunzawabaya v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., NY Slip Op 04891 (1st Dep't June 15, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Medical malpractice and the continuous treatment doctrine.
Practice point: When plaintiff endorsed and delivered the check to his friend, the friend became the holder of the check, pursuant to NY UCC 3-202[1]. Thus, only the friend was entitled to negotiate the check or to enforce payment in his own name, pursuant to NY UCC 3-301[1]. Plaintiff's argument that he, as payee of the check, is entitled to enforce its return or payment is unavailing. Plaintiff lacks standing to sue the bank for the return or proceeds of the check, because he is no longer the holder of the check.
Case: Delight Bvunzawabaya v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., NY Slip Op 04891 (1st Dep't June 15, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Medical malpractice and the continuous treatment doctrine.
June 27, 2017
CPLR 205(a).
CPLR § 205. Termination of action. (a) New action by plaintiff. If an
action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by
a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to
prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the
plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff dies, and the cause of action survives,
his or her executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the
same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences
within six months after the termination provided that the new action
would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the
prior action and that service upon defendant is effected within such
six-month period.
Practice point: An out-of-state action is not a "prior action" within the meaning of the statute.
Case in point: Deadco Petroleum v. Trafigura AG, NY Slip Op 04887 (1st Dep't June 15, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Standing to sue a bank for the return of a check.
Practice point: An out-of-state action is not a "prior action" within the meaning of the statute.
Case in point: Deadco Petroleum v. Trafigura AG, NY Slip Op 04887 (1st Dep't June 15, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Standing to sue a bank for the return of a check.
June 26, 2017
A non-resident's consent to jurisdiction.
The Appellate Division reversed the motion court and dismissed the complaint in this action where the plaintiff alleges that he brokered a deal for the purchase of a company, and that the defendants agreed that, on entering into a purchase agreement, they would pay him a commission, but did not. The defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)..
Practice point: A non-resident's consent to jurisdiction for issues arising out of the purchase agreement does not constitute a consent with respect to plaintiff's claims for a commission.
Case in point: Ausch v. Sutton, NY Slip Op 04813 (2d Dep't June 14, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: CPLR 205(a).
Practice point: A non-resident's consent to jurisdiction for issues arising out of the purchase agreement does not constitute a consent with respect to plaintiff's claims for a commission.
Case in point: Ausch v. Sutton, NY Slip Op 04813 (2d Dep't June 14, 2017)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: CPLR 205(a).
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