Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of the § 240(1) cause of action in which plaintiff alleged that he was injured while riding in one of the building's elevators.  The passenger elevator was not a safety device for protecting a construction worker from a risk posed by elevation as contemplated by the statute. However, the Appellate Division reversed dismissal of the § 241(6) claim to the extent that it was predicated on violations of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7(e). While there were no facts alleged to support a claim that plaintiff was injured as the result of a slipping hazard, plaintiff's complaint, as supplemented by his affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion, sufficiently alleged that debris was one of the causes of his fall.

Case:  Smith v. Extell W. 45th St. LLC, NY Slip Op 07089 (1st Dep't October 27, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  The first-to-file rule in a legal malpractice action.

A defective roadway condition.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of the complaint alleging that a defective roadway condition caused plaintiff's bicycle accident. Plaintiff's submission of an inspection report was insufficient to show that the City had issued written acknowledgment of the defect within the meaning of Administrative Code § 7-201(c)(2), since the report identifies a defect at a different location. Awareness of one defect in the area does not constitute notice of a different particular defect which caused the accident. In addition, it was speculative for plaintiff's expert to assume that, because no permits had been issued, the City must have created the roadway defect.

Case:  Ragolia v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 06950 (1st Dep't October 25, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Labor Law §§ 240(1) and  241(6).

Disqualification of an attorney as an advocate-witness.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the disqualification where the attorney was likely to be called as a witness on significant issues of fact regarding his conduct with respect to the money that he is holding in escrow.

Student note:  Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1200.0) rule 3.7, an attorney shall not act as an advocate before a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness on a significant issue of fact. The rule is intended to provide guidance, but is not binding authority, in deciding a motion to disqualify.

Case:  Bajohr v. Berg, NY Slip Op 06797 (2d Dep't October 19, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: A defective roadway condition.

Vacatur in the interest of substantial justice.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed that, even though the default was unexplained, the motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting vacatur in the interest of substantial justice. The relief was justified by defendants' payment of substantially all of the amount due just two months after the order and judgment they sought to vacate. In addition, plaintiffs do not claim prejudice.

Case:  Marbru Assoc. v. White, NY Slip Op 06864 (1st Dep't October 20, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Disqualification of an attorney as an advocate-witness.

Service of a notice of claim by regular mail.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to serve a proper notice of claim. The notice was served by regular mail on the Transit Authority within 90 days after the claim arose, and the Transit Authority requested a 50-h hearing.  While service was noncompliant with statutory provisions, the notice was valid because it was served within the statutory period and the public corporation demanded an examination of the claimant.

Case:  Lapsley-Cockett v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth., NY Slip Op 06861 (1st Dep't October 20, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Vacatur in the interest of substantial justice.

Jurisdiction over foreign corporations.

Practice point:  Pursuant to CPLR 301, the corporation is amenable to suit in New York courts if it has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of doing business here that a finding of its presence in New York is warranted.  The exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of state law must comport with the due process requirement that the corporation's affiliations with New York are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home here.

CPLR 302(a)(1) grants New York courts jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries when the action arises out of the nondomiciliaries' transaction of any business in New York.  In deciding jurisdiction under the statute, the court will determine (1) whether the defendant transacted business in New York and, if so, (2) whether the cause of action asserted arose from that transaction. In order to satisfy the second prong, there must be an articulable nexus or a substantial relationship between the defendant's New York activity and the alleged cause of action.

Case:  Fernandez v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., NY Slip Op 06679 (2d Dep't October 12, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Service of a notice of claim by regular mail.

An elevator company's duty of care.

Practice point:  If the company agrees to maintain the elevator in safe operating condition, it may be liable to a passenger for failure to correct conditions of which it has knowledge or failure to use reasonable care to discover and correct a condition that it should have found. In addition, a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care, and, where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty of safe maintenance, may be liable in tort to third persons.

Case:  Fajardo v. Mainco El. & Elec. Corp., NY Slip Op 06678 (2d Dep't October 12, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Jurisdiction over foreign corporations.

The correct standard on a summary judgment motion.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed that the motion court had applied the correct standard in denying defendant's motion, as defendant merely pointed to perceived gaps in plaintiff's proof, rather than submitting evidence showing why plaintiff's claims fail.

Case:  Ricci v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co., NY Slip Op 06741 (1st Dep't October 13, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  An elevator company's duty of care.

An untimely summary judgment motion.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's cause of action for third-party promissory estoppel. The motion court's rules required dispositive motions to be filed within 60 days of the filing of a note of issue. Defendant filed the motion papers nine days after the time to do so had expired, rendering the motion untimely, pursuant to CPLR 3212[a].

Case:  Cullity v. Posner, NY Slip Op 06738 (1st Dep't October 13, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  The correct standard on a summary judgment motion.

A promise to answer for another's debt.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the motion court and dismissed the complaint in this action to recover on a personal guaranty. A promise to answer for another's debt must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-701[a][2].  Here, as the authenticity of defendant's signature was disputed and plaintiff sought to establish its authenticity through lay witness testimony, plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the witness personally observed the execution of the guaranty, or was so familiar with defendant's signature that he could readily recognize the signature as authentic. Plaintiff offered no such evidence, and did not establish that the signature was notarized or accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment, pursuant to CPLR 4538.

Case:  A. F. Supply Corp. v. Perfect Lock & Sec., Inc., NY Slip Op 06672 (2d Dep't October 12, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  An untimely summary judgment motion.

Dismissal of a claim based on a fall on the stairs.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants established prima facie that they did not cause or create the defect in the stairs that allegedly caused plaintiff to fall, and that they had no actual or constructive notice of any defect. They submitted evidence that the stairs were built in 1927 and had never been worked on thereafter, that there were no earlier reported incidents or complaints, and that no violations or citations had been issued with respect to the condition of the stairs. They also submitted their testimony that they used the stairs regularly, that no one had ever before fallen on the stairs, and that immediately after the accident they could find no defect.

In opposition, plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact. As to the issue of notice, the motion court was not required to consider their unsworn witness statement since the statement was the only evidence submitted on that issue. In any event, the unsworn statement is not probative of whether defendants had notice of the alleged defect.

Plaintiffs' expert's affidavit is not evidence that the stairs were out of compliance with commonly accepted safety standards or practices, as the expert did not refer to any specific safety standards or practices. Neither did the expert say that the absence of a handrail or the differential in the dimensions of the risers and treads made the stairs inherently dangerous.

Case:  Lovell v. Thompson, NY Slip Op 06736 (1st Dep't October 13, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A promise to answer for another's debt.