Assumption of the risk in a zip-line accident.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the granting of the motion to dismiss, noting that if plaintiff had merely lost his grip and fallen off the seat while riding the zip line, he would be barred from recovery because that is an inherent risk of zip-lining. However, plaintiff's claim is not that he fell victim to such a common hazard. Rather, it is that the zip line was negligently constructed by defendant and that he had no way of knowing that. A person cannot be said to have assumed the risk of being injured by faulty equipment when he was unaware that the equipment was faulty.

Student note:  A participant in an athletic or recreational activity assumes known risks and relieves a defendant of any duty to safeguard him or her from those risks.  However, a participant only consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation. Whether a plaintiff was aware of the risk is key to determining if he or she assumed it, and this can only be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff. In addition, sporting participants will not be deemed to have assumed concealed or unreasonably increased risks.

Case:  Zelkowitz v. Country Group, Inc., NY Slip Op 05732 (1st Dep't August 4, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A chain collision accident.

A post-appeal motion for leave to renew.

Practice point:  On a post-appeal motion for leave to renew, the movant bears a heavy burden of showing due diligence in presenting the new evidence to the Supreme Court.  The motion is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation.

Student note:  Pursuant to CPLR 2221(e)(2), a motion for leave to renew "shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination . . . and . . . shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion."

Case:  Priant v. New York City Tr. Auth., NY Slip Op 05707 (2d Dep't August 3, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Assumption of the risk in a zip-line accident.

Traffic lights and municipal liability.

Practice point:  The installation of a traffic control signal, where it had not previously existed, is a discretionary governmental function that does not give rise to state liability. However, liability is imposed where there is a failure properly to maintain an already established traffic ligh, and where that failure was a proximate cause of the accident.

Student note:  The state has a non-delegable duty to maintain the roadway in safe condition.

Case:  Chang v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 05728 (1st Dep't August 4, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A post-appeal motion for leave to renew.

Venue in an action involving a domestic corporation.

Practice point:  The venue of an action is proper in the county in which any of the parties resided at the time of commencement. The sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county.

Student note:  To prevail on a motion pursuant to CPLR 510(1) to change venue, a defendant must show that the plaintiff's choice of venue is improper, and also that the defendant's choice of venue is proper.

Case:  Kidd v. 22-11 Realty, LLC, NY Slip Op 05705 (2d Dep't August 3, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Traffic lights and municipal liability.

Attorney disqualification based on an alleged conflict of interest.

Practice point:  Where, as here, a party is neither a present nor a former client of the law firm sought to be disqualified, it acks standing to seek disqualification.

Student note:  The basis of a motion to disqualify an attorney due to an alleged conflict of interest is an allegation of a breach of a fiduciary duty owed by an attorney to a current or former client. When the firm sought to be disqualified has never represented the moving party, that firm owes no duty to that party, and there can be no duty breached.

Case:  Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., NY Slip Op 05704 (2d Dep't August 3, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Venue in an action involving a domestic corporation.

An "error in judgment" charge.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division determined that a new trial is required because the Supreme Court erred in giving an "error in judgment" charge over the plaintiff's objection. The Appellate Division found that this case does not present a choice between one of two or more medically acceptable alternative treatments or techniques.  The defendant testified that he diagnosed the decedent with a benign non-urgent condition, and he neither suspected cancer nor considered the option of sending the decedent for further diagnostic testing. Thus, the case presented the jury with the straightforward question of whether the defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care in diagnosing the decedent.

Student note:  The charge is appropriate only in a narrow category of medical malpractice cases in which there is evidence that defendant physician considered and chose among several medically acceptable treatment alternatives.

Case:  Lacqua v. Silich, NY Slip Op 05628 (2d Dep't July 27, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Attorney disqualification based on an alleged conflict of interest.

A municipality's liability based on a special duty owed to an injured plaintiff.

Practice point:  When a municipality provides ambulance service by emergency medical technicians in response to a 911 call for assistance, it performs a governmental function and cannot be held liable unless it owed a special duty to the injured party. Such a special duty can arise, as is relevant in this action, where the government entity voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally, or where the municipality voluntarily assumed a special relationship with the plaintiff.

Student note:  A municipality will be held to have voluntarily assumed a duty or special relationship with the plaintiffs where there is: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.

Case:  Holloway v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 05267 (2d Dep't July 27, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  An "error in judgment" charge.

Res judicata and permissive counterclaims.

Practice point:  New York is a permissive counterclaim jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 3011. New York's permissive counterclaim rule may save from the bar of res judicata those claims for separate or different relief that could have been, but were not interposed in the parties' prior action.  However, it does not permit a party to remain silent in the first action and then bring a second one on the basis of a preexisting claim for relief that would impair the rights or interests established in the first action.

Student note:  Under New York's transactional analysis approach to res judicata, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.

Case:  Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Allianz Risk Transfer AG, NY Slip Op 05618 (1st Dep't July 21, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A municipality's liability based on a special duty owed to an injured plaintiff.

Summary judgment in a negligence action.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the motion court's granting of defendants' motion and reinstated the complaint in this action for injuries allegedly sustained when plaintiff's motorcycle came in contact with the rear of a box truck operated by defendant-driver and owned by defendant-owner. Defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter other things, an affidavit from defendant-driver and a number of verified witness statements which presented conflicting evidence as to how the accident occurred, including a statement that the defendants' vehicle "stop[ped] short at [a] green light [and] the motorcycle . . . had no time to stop or maneuver." On this record, defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant-driver was free from fault in the happening of the accident.

Student note:  A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the accident.

Case:  Gonzalez v. Ayala, NY Slip Op 05626 (2d Dep't July 27, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Res judicata and permissive counterclaims.

Summary judgment on a motor vehicle accident claim.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of the motion dismissing plaintiff's claims based on a lack of a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).

Defendant established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury to her cervical spine, lumbar spine, or right knee as a result of the motor vehicle accident at issue. Defendant submitted the affirmed reports of an orthopedist and a neurologist, showing no significant limitations, negative clinical results, and a resolved sprain and contusion. Defendant also submitted a radiologist's affirmed report which found, upon review of the MRI scans, no evidence of any disc bulges or herniations in the spine, no recent or acute posttraumatic or causally related disc changes, and only preexisting degenerative changes in the knee.

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. She provided no medical findings of resulting limitations in use of her spine or right knee, shown by either quantified range of motion testing or by a qualitative assessment of her limitations compared with normal function. Plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon never examined her spine, and, although he performed diagnostic arthroscopic surgery on her right knee, he failed to set forth any findings of limitations in the knee, either before or after the surgery. In the absence of evidence of limitations, the orthopedist's conclusory opinion that the accident caused the right knee injury was also insufficient.

Student note:  The unaffirmed MRI reports, which were the only objective evidence submitted by plaintiff concerning her claims of spinal injury, are inadmissible because they are unsworn, and were not relied upon by defendant's experts.

Case:   Hernandez v Cespedes, NY Slip Op 05662 (1st Dep't July 28, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Summary judgment in a negligence action.

A failed motion to strike an answer.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court, finding that plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer and for summary judgment on its complaint should have been denied. Striking a party's pleadings is a drastic sanction that requires a clear showing that the party's conduct was willful and contumacious, and plaintiff failed to make this showing. Instead, the record makes clear that the facts surrounding defendant's failure to appear for deposition are in dispute. Defendant submitted affidavits stating that plaintiff had affirmatively agreed to postpone depositions while the parties tried to discern, among other things, who had signed which agreements. The Appellate Division said that, under these circumstances, there must be a hearing to determine whether defendant's failure to attend the deposition was willful and contumacious,

Student note:  The Appellate Division noted that, in New York, there is a strong preference for deciding matters on the merits.

Case:  CEMD El. Corp. v. Metrotech LLC I, NY Slip Op 05542 (1st Dep't July 14, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Summary judgment on a motor vehicle accident claim.