A transfer of venue.

Practice point:  In this slip and fall action where plaintiff is a Kentucky resident, the Appellate Division determined that venue was properly transferred to Albany County. The designation of venue in New York County was proper, pursuant to CPLR 503(c), since two of the corporate defendants have their principal places of business within that county. However, the situs of plaintiff's injury provides a basis for a discretionary change of venue, pursuant to CPLR 510 [3], in that, all things being equal, a transitory action should be tried in the county where the cause of action arose.

Student note:  This rule is predicated on the notion of convenience for trial witnesses to be present at trial.

Case:  Wickman v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., NY Slip Op 03235 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  A counterclaim for breach of contract resulting in lost business opportunities.

Re-service while a motion to dismiss is pending.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, as plaintiff established that it re-served the appellant during the pendency of the motion. Plaintiff's re-service of the summons and complaint during the pendency of the motion effectively obviated the jurisdictional objection.

Student note:  An affidavit of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service of process, pursuant to CPLR 308(2).

Case:  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Valentino, NY Slip Op 03116 (2d Dept. 2015)

Tomorrow's issue:  A transfer of venue.

A claim of a bus driver's negligence.

Practice point:  To prevail on a cause of action alleging that a common carrier's driver was negligent in stopping a bus, a plaintiff must prove that the stop was unusual and violent, rather than merely one of the sort of jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel. A plaintiff may not satisfy the burden of proof merely by characterizing the stop as unusual and violent. Instead, there must be objective evidence of the force of the stop sufficient to establish an inference that the stop was extraordinary and violent, of a different class than the jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel and, therefore, attributable to the negligence of defendant.

Student note:  In seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint, however, common carriers have the burden of establishing, prima facie, that the stop was not unusual and violent.

Case:  Alandette v. New York City Tr. Auth., NY Slip Op 03113 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Re-service while a motion to dismiss is pending.

Summary judgment while a stay is pending.

Practice point:  While defendant's motion for summary judgment was pending, plaintiff's counsel moved for permission to withdraw. The motion court granted counsel's application and ordered the case stayed "for 45 days from the date of service of a copy of this order." However, plaintiff was not served with the order, and defendant's motion for summary judgment was heard and granted in plaintiff's absence. The order granting the motion on default directed defendant to settle an order, which was entered.  Plaintiff's new counsel moved to vacate these two orders on the ground that the grant of summary judgment while the action was stayed was a nullity.

The Appellate Division agreed, and reversed the motion court. After his former counsel was granted leave to withdraw, the action was stayed by court order and operation of CPLR 321(c). As plaintiff was never served with the order dismissing his attorney, the 45 day stay never expired.

Student note:  Defendant cannot avoid the stay by arguing that it did not go into effect until served on plaintiff, since the failure to serve the order cannot accrue to defendant's benefit.

Case:  Matos v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 03074 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: A claim of bus driver negligence.

A question of service.

Practice point:  Defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 5015[a][4], to vacate his default and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that he had not been served with copies of the summons and complaint.  The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that service of process was properly effected under CPLR 308(2).  The Appelate Division reversed, and remitted.

Defendant submitted an affidavit asserting that he had never lived at the address at which the substituted service was allegedly effected, thereby denying that he was served at his "actual . . . dwelling place or usual place of abode," as required by CPLR 308[2]).

In opposition, plaintiff conceded that defendant had resided at multiple residences during the six years prior to the commencement of the action and so its submissions revealed a question of fact with respect to whether the address where service was allegedly effected was defendant's actual dwelling place or usual place of abode.  As the submitted evidence was not dispositive, there should have been a hearing.

Student note:  A process server's affidavit constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service, pursuant to CPLR 308(2)

Case:  Central Mtge. Co. v. Ward, NY Slip Op 02926 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Summary judgment while a stay is pending.

A Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

Practice point:  Plaintiff established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim based on his testimony that he was injured when he fell from a height of six stories when two workers standing on the ground holding ropes that were supposed to keep the scaffold he was standing on level, simultaneously loosened the ropes, causing the scaffold to shift from a horizontal to a vertical position. Plaintiff also established that his accident was caused by the lack of a guardrail on the side of the scaffold. Plaintiff was not required to show a specific defect in the safety devices since the evidence plainly established that they did not provide adequate protection from the risk of falling.

In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Although they argue that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, they failed to submit any admissible evidence to support their allegation that plaintiff failed to attach his safety harness to the lifeline in the proper manner.

Student note:  Even if there were admissible evidence to that effect, the scaffold fell as a result of the ropes supporting it being loosened, rendering plaintiff's alleged conduct contributory negligence which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

Case:  Guaman v 1963 Ryer Realty Corp., NY Slip Op 03039 (1st Dept.)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:   A question of service.

Calculating quantum meruit compensation.

Practice point:  The award of quantum meruit compensation under 22 NYCRR 691.10(b) is not limited to a calculation based on the number of hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, but can also be calculated as a portion of a contingent fee. In either case, the court must weigh the relevant factors, which include evidence of the time and skill required in that case; the matter's complexity; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the client's benefit from the attorney's services; and the fee usually charged by other attorneys for similar services.

Student note:  An award in quantum meruit should reflect the court's assessment of the qualitative value of the services rendered, made after weighing all relevant factors considered in valuing legal services. While not binding or determinative, the court also should consider any compensation agreement between outgoing and incoming counsel.

Case:  Biagioni v. Narrows MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., NY Slip Op 02924 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:   A Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

Freezing rainstorm in progress.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, finding that the undisputed fact that plaintiff's slip and fall occurred during a freezing-rainstorm in progress established prima facie that defendants were not negligent in failing to remove the ice on the sidewalk in front of their building on which plaintiff testified that she slipped .

The record also shows that, on the day of the accident, defendants' maintenance staff followed its regular protocol for clearing newly fallen snow and ice from the sidewalk and the building's entrance area at 6 a.m. and again at 7 a.m., before the start of the school day.  While plaintiff contends that in clearing the sidewalk defendants created a hazardous condition or exacerbated a natural hazard created by the storm, she submitted no evidence to support her contention.

Student note:  Plaintiff did not raise a material fact issue by pointing to the inconsistent testimony of a maintenance worker as to whether salt was used on the sidewalk before plaintiff's fall, as plaintiff failed to explain how using or not using salt could have created or exacerbated the naturally occurring ice condition.

Case:  Sevilla v. Calhoun School, Inc., NY Slip Op 03030 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Calculating quantum meruit compensation.

Enforcing a stipulation.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of plaintiff's motion to enforce the stipulation, which did not contain any provision requiring plaintiff to make payments on the mortgage or water bill. A court may not imply a term where the circumstances of the contract's formation indicate that, when the contract was made, the parties must have foreseen the contingency at issue and the agreement can be enforced according to its terms. Here, the underlying controversy between the parties involved defendant's claim that plaintiff failed to make mortgage and other payments. When the parties entered into the stipulation, they must have foreseen that contingency..

Plaintiff's motion papers established that defendant failed to respond to an offer to purchase the property and, therefore, established that defendant breached the stipulation.  Defendant failed to show that plaintiff breached the stipulation, and did not proffer sufficient cause to invalidate the agreement, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident.

Student note:  A stipulation of settlement is a contract, enforceable according to its terms. When a court enforces a stipulation of settlement, it must effectuate the parties' intent. As with any contract, where the terms of a stipulation of settlement are unambiguous, the Supreme Court must give effect to the parties' intent based upon the plain meaning of the words used by the parties.

Case:  Bethea v. Thousand, NY Slip Op 02923 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Freezing rainstorm in progress.

Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-paint condition.

Practice point:  Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-based paint condition may be established by proof that the landlord (1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs; (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned; (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises; (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children; and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment.

Student note:  Under New York common law, a landowner has a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.   For a landlord to be held liable for injuries resulting from a defective condition upon the premises, the plaintiff must establish that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected.

Case:  Greene v. Mullen, NY Slip Op 02729 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Enforcing a stipulation.

Leave to amend the complaint to assert malicious prosecution.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to assert a cause of action alleging malicious prosecution.  As the proposed cause of action failed to plead the required element of interference with person or property, it was palpably insufficient.

Student note:  In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit.

Case:  Galanova v. Safir, NY Slip Op 02723 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-paint condition.