Discovery and striking a pleading.

Practice point: Defense counsel asserted that he could not produce the individual defendant for deposition because he could not secure his cooperation or locate him. The defendants failed to substantiate a reasonable excuse for the individual defendant's failure to appear for a court-ordered deposition. In addition, the defendants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the corporate defendant's failure to appear at a court-ordered deposition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in issuing a conditional order requiring the defendants to appear for depositions within a specified time or face the sanction of striking their answer.

When the defendants failed to appear for their court-ordered depositions within the specified time, the conditional order became absolute.To be relieved of the order's striking their answer, the defendants were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to appear for depositions and a potentially meritorious defense.The defendants failed to demonstrate either, and their answer was properly stricken. As a result of having their answer stricken, the defendants were deemed to admit all traversable allegations in the complaint, including the basic allegation of liability. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Student note: A court may issue an order striking out pleadings or rendering a judgment by default as a sanction against a party who refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed, pursuant to CPLR 3126[3]. While actions should be resolved on the merits when possible, a court may strike an answer upon a clear showing that the failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful and contumacious conduct.

Case: Almonte v. Pichardo, NY Slip Op 02209 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: Motions for renewal and reargument.

Slip and fall, and precluding a theory of liability.

Practice point:  Plaintiff alleged that she was injured when she slipped and fell on a wet foliage condition located on defendant's grounds. Defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment as to this open and obvious condition, which was not inherently dangerous. Defendant's meteorologist stated that the wind was sufficient to create the foliage condition and that light rain, two hours earlier, accounted for the wetness of the leaves. Moreover, defendant's grounds' supervisor stated that the grounds crew took reasonable efforts to remove fallen foliage from the development's extensive property, by patrolling the grounds daily. Under the circumstances, defendant established that it met its duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition.

Student note: Plaintiff's theory of liability that the slippery condition was caused by insufficient drainage for the sprinkler system was raised for the first time in opposition to the motion. The theory was precluded since it was not set forth in the notice of claim.

Case: Verdejo v. New York City Hous. Auth., NY Slip Op 02323 (1st Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Discovery and striking a pleading.

The inadmissibility of hearsay hospital notes.

Practice point: The Appellate Division determined that it was harmful error for the trial court to admit into evidence the hearsay hospital notes of the orthopedic surgeon who examined plaintiff after her accident. According to the doctor's notes, plaintiff stated that she slipped and fell on wet ground and complained of severe right ankle pain. However, at trial the doctor testified that he only assumed that the statement came from plaintiff. Moreover, the doctor admitted that he did not recognize plaintiff and had no independent recollection of the case. In addition, his original history notes were discarded, and he was unsure from whence he received the information.

Student note: Generally, admissions not germane to the treatment or diagnosis of a plaintiff's injuries are not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. A hearsay entry in a hospital record as to the cause of an injury may be admissible, even if not germane to diagnosis, if the entry is inconsistent with a position taken at trial. However, there must be evidence that connects the party to the entry.

Case: Grant v. New York City Transit Authority, NY Slip Op 02318 (1st Dept. 2013).

 Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Slip and fall, and precluding a theory of liablity.

Vacating a default.

Practice point:  In deciding a motion to vacate a default, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court. A general assertion that the default was occasioned by the defendant's insurance broker or liability carrier is insufficient. Here, the defendant's unsubstantiated claims that he believed that his insurance broker had forwarded the summons and complaint to his insurer and that his insurer was providing a defense are unreasonable given that the defendant was served with the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment.

Student note: The defendant's claim that he did not receive the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment, the default order, and other papers related to this action because the address to which they were mailed did not contain his unit number was improperly raised for the first time on appeal and therefore was not properly before the Appellate Division.

Case: Spitzer v. Landau, NY Slip Op 02067 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:The inadmissibility of hearsay hospital notes.

Defaults and damages.

Practice point:  A defendant whose answer is stricken as a result of a default admits all traversable allegations in the complaint, including the basic allegation of liability, but does not admit the plaintiff's conclusion as to damages.

Student note: Where an entry of a default judgment against a defendant is made after an application to the court, the defendant is entitled to a full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, give testimony and offer proof in mitigation of damages.

Case: Rawlings v. Gillert, NY Slip Op 02063 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Vacating a default.

Motions to dismiss.

Practice point: A motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law.

Student note: When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action. In considering the motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus.

Case: Faith Assembly v. Titledge of N.Y. Abstract, LLC, NY Slip Op 02046 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: Defaults and damages.

Pain and suffering, and expert witnesses.

Practice point: A claim to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering requires proof that the injured party experienced some level of cognitive awareness following the injury. Mere conjecture, surmise or speculation is not enough to sustain a claim for such damages.

Student note: A jury is not required to accept an expert's opinion to the exclusion of the facts and circumstances disclosed by other testimony and/or the facts disclosed on cross-examination. Rather, a jury is at liberty to reject an expert's opinion if it finds the facts to be different from those which formed the basis for the opinion or if, after careful consideration of all the evidence in the case, it disagrees with the opinion.
Determinations regarding the credibility of expert witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal, as the jury had the opportunity to observe and hear the experts.

Case: Curry v. Hudson Val. Hosp. Ctr., NY Slip Op 02043 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:Motions to dismiss.

Judgments as a matter of law CPLR 4401

Practice point: The Appellate Division's decision and order in a prior appeal, determining that questions of fact existed precluding summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor, did not decide that there necessarily would be established an issue of fact at the trial which would have to be determined by a jury. So, the Appellate Division's determination on the summary judgment motion did not preclude the plaintiff from seeking judgment as a matter of law upon the close of evidence at trial, and did not require the automatic denial of such a motion.

Student note: To succeed on a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a party has the burden of showing that there is no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the opposing party and against him or her.

Case:  Coates v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Sts., NY Slip Op 02041 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Pain and suffering, and expert witnesses.

Curing a defective complaint.

Practice point:  In a prior appeal in this action, the Appellate Division held that plaintiffs could not rely on the relation-back provisions in CPLR 203(f) to cure their defective initial complaint, based on their failure to comply with the subject agreements' condition precedent to commencing an action, since the doctrine is dependent upon the existence of a valid preexisting action. However, on this appeal, the Appellate Division found that the savings clause of CPLR 205(a) does not bar plaintiffs' action, since the statute was created to serve in those cases in which the prior action was defective and so had to be dismissed.

Student note: The dismissal of the prior action for plaintiffs' failure to comply with a condition precedent was not a judgment on the merits, and plaintiff commenced a new action within the six-month period required by CPLR 205(a).

Case: Southern Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Impact Envtl. Eng'g, PLLC, NY Slip Op 02146 (1st Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Judgments as a matter of law CPLR 4401

Validity of service.

Practice point: It is the plaintiff's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained by proper service of process. A process server's affidavit ordinarily constitutes a prima facie showing of proper service.

Student note: Where the defendant submits a sworn denial which specifically refutes the process server's affidavit, the prima facie showing is rebutted and the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a hearing.

Case: Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Gaines, NY Slip Op 02034 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Curing a defective complaint.

Money judgments.

Practice point: Pursuant to CPLR 211(b), a money judgment is presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of twenty years from the time when the party recovering it was first entitled to enforce it. This presumption is conclusive, except as against a person who within the twenty years acknowledges an indebtedness, or makes a payment, of all or part of the amount recovered by the judgment, or his heir or personal representative, or a person whom he otherwise represents. Such an acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person to be charged. If such an acknowledgment or payment is made, the judgment is conclusively presumed to be paid and satisfied as against any person after the expiration of twenty years after the last acknowledgment or payment made by him.

Student note: Accordingly, unless the party against whom a money judgment is granted acknowledges the indebtedness in a signed writing, the statute of limitations for an action to collect on a money judgment is 20 years from the date that the judgment can first be enforced. If, however, a party acknowledges the indebtedness to a money judgment, the statute of limitations runs anew, and is then 20 years from the last acknowledgment.

Case: First N.Y. Bank for Bus. v. Alexander, NY Slip Op 01796 (1st Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: Validity of service.