It has long been the rule that ambiguities in a contractual instrument will be resolved contra proferentem, against the party who prepared or presented it.
Denemark v. New Ch. Capital, Inc., NY Slip Op 04553 (1st Dep't July 23, 2026)
It has long been the rule that ambiguities in a contractual instrument will be resolved contra proferentem, against the party who prepared or presented it.
Denemark v. New Ch. Capital, Inc., NY Slip Op 04553 (1st Dep't July 23, 2026)
The appeal from so much of the order dated August 7, 2024, as granted that branch of K.C.'s application which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff did not comply with the conditional order of preclusion must be dismissed, because that portion of the order did not decide a motion made on notice, pursuant to CPLR 5701[a][2], and leave to appeal from that portion of the order has not been granted.
Village's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it must be dismissed, because no appeal lies from an order entered upon the default of the appealing party, pursuant to CPLR 5511.
Chelsea Café Group, LLC v. K.C. Engg. & Land Surveying, P.C., NY Slip Op 04396 (2d Dep't July 15, 2026)
A party seeking to vacate a default in opposing a motion must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion. While CPLR 2005 allows courts to excuse a default due to law office failure, it was not the Legislature's intent to routinely excuse such defaults, and mere neglect will not be accepted as a reasonable excuse. A conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated claim of law office failure does not rise to the level of a reasonable excuse.
Ferere v. Saks Fifth Ave., LLC, NY Slip Op 04401 (2d Dep't July 15, 2026)
In order to state a prima facie case of failure to accommodate religious belief or practice under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he actually required an accommodation of his religious practice, and (2) that the employer’s desire to avoid the actually required prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in (3) an adverse employment decision.
Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System, 2d Cir. July 15, 2026)
Economic harms, absent an injury to person or property, should be resolved in contract, rather than tort.
Asinga v. Gatorade Co., 2d Cir. July 17, 2026
A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved in the amended pleading, pursuant to CPLR 203[f]. The relation-back doctrine permits a plaintiff to interpose a claim or cause of action which would otherwise be time-barred, where the allegations of the original complaint gave notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved and the cause of action would have been timely interposed if asserted in the original complaint. When determining whether a defendant has been placed on notice of the transactions or occurrences underlying a new claim for purposes of CPLR 203(f) and the relation-back doctrine, the court should look only at the four corners of the original pleading.
Benjamin v. Nail Peak, Inc., NY Slip Op 04394 (2d Dep't July 15, 2026)
After having been served with process, the defendant who wants to avoid a default must respond in a proper and timely manner. CPLR 320 specifies three ways by which the defendant can appear in the action: (1) service of an answer; (2) making a motion which has the effect of extending the time to answer; or (3) serving a notice of appearance.
A notice of appearance is a simple document that notifies the plaintiff that the defendant is appearing in the action. Although a defendant appears within the meaning of CPLR 320(a) by merely serving a notice of appearance, service of the notice does not absolve a defendant from complying with the time restrictions imposed by CPLR 320(a) which govern the service of an answer or the making of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211.
Contrary to the defendants' contention, they defaulted in appearing in the action by failing to timely answer the complaint. The filing of a notice of appearance and opposition to the plaintiff's prior motions did not cure the defendants' default.
55-57 Hester Grocery, Inc. v. Queens Metro Stop, Inc., NY Slip Op 04392 (2d Dep't July 15, 2026)
The appeal from so much of the order as directed a hearing to determine whether the defendant was properly served with process is dismissed. The challenged portion of the order merely directed a judicial hearing to aid in the disposition of a motion and does not affect a substantial right. Therefore, it is not appealable as of right, and leave to appeal has not been granted.
Chevy Chase Funding, LLC v. Aucapina, NY Slip Op 04274 (2d Dep't July 8, 2026)
Where the defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) on the ground of lack of standing, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff's lack of standing, rather than on the plaintiff to affirmatively establish its standing in order for the motion to be denied.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co v. Pruitt, NY Slip Op 04271 (2d Dep't July 8, 2026)
Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to renew. Plaintiff did not submit newly discovered facts that existed but were unknown to it when it made its original motion. Rather, plaintiff asserted on its renewal motion that the original order to show cause had since been properly electronically filed and that the death of defendant-borrower divested the court of jurisdiction to issue the original order. However, his death was not newly discovered, nor was it unknown to plaintiff at the time of the original motion. On the contrary, by its own account, plaintiff was aware of defendant's 2014 death as early as October 6, 2015, when it was informed of the death at a hearing. Plaintiff also did not offer a reasonable justification for its failure to include the purportedly new facts on the original motion, pursuant to CPLR 2221[e][2] and [3].
In any event, the motion fails on the merits. Plaintiff failed to establish how defendant's death would have affected the merits of this case, nor did it establish that a stay of the proceedings was mandated pending substitution of a legal representative under CPLR 1015(a). Before defendant's death, the mortgage was in default, this action had been commenced, and plaintiff had already been granted summary judgment on its complaint as against defendant.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Vitucci, NY Slip Op 04366 (1st Dep't July 9, 2026)
While a medical expert need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to testify regarding accepted practices in that field, the witness nonetheless should be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge, or experience from which it can be assumed that the opinion rendered is reliable. Where the witness opines outside his area of specialization, a foundation must be laid tending to support the reliability of the opinion rendered.
Akimov v. Bilik, NY Slip Op 04270 (2d Dep't July 8, 2026)