Education Law.

Practice point: A petitioner's challenge to the termination of probationary employment under a physical education license will be dismissed if petitioner fails to establish that the termination was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, in violation of a statute, or otherwise done in bad faith.

Practitioners should note that, even if petitioner were not given the 60-day statutory notice, which, pursuant to Education Law
§ 2573[1][a]), would require one day's pay for each day the notice is late, petitioner is not entitled to the payment when, on termination, petitioner immediately resumed duties at the same school and at the same rate of pay under the common branch license under which petitioner was fully tenured.

Case: Curcio v. New York City Dept. of Educ., NY Slip Op 08020 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Municipal liability.

Practice point: The City is not a proper party to an action where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of tripping and falling on public school grounds.

Practitioners should note that, although the 2002 amendments to the Education Law (L 2002, ch 91) give the mayor greater control over education and limit the Department of Education’s powers, they do not establish a basis to hold the City liable for this plaintiff’s personal injuries.

Case: Bailey v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 08003 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Court of Claims Act.

Practice point: An otherwise timely claim will be dismissed if it is verified only by plaintiff’s attorney and thus is noncompliant with the verification requirement of § 8-b(4).

Practitioners should note that CPLR 205(a), which allows re-commencement of an action which was terminated not on the merits within six months of dismissal, does not apply to claims under § 8-b, the requirements of which must be strictly construed and the terms of which make no reference to the CPLR.

Case: Taylor v. State of New York, NY Slip Op 07976 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

You can find the statutory language here.

Labor Law.

Practice point: An accident falls within the scope of § 240(1) when there is evidence that plaintiff was struck by a falling object which could have been, but was not, adequately secured by one of the devices enumerated in the statute.

Practitioners should note that an alleged violation of Industrial Code 9 NYCRR §§ 23-5.1(c) is insufficiently specific to support a
§ 241(6) claim.

Case: Greaves v. Obayashi Corp., NY Slip Op 07970 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

You can find the Code's language here.

Fraud.

Practice point: A plaintiff fails to plead a cause of action for fraud with sufficient particularity, pursuant to CPLR 3016[b], merely by alleging that defendant's representations were false, absent factual support for that assertion, and without pleading any of the other elements of fraud.

Practitioners should note that the essential elements of a cause of action sounding in fraud are representation of a material existing fact, falsity, scienter, deception and injury.

Case: Caldwell v. Gumley-Haft L.L.C., NY Slip Op 07968 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Duty of care.

Practice point: In a suit involving leased commercial property, defendant cannot be liable for plaintiff’s injuries absent evidence that defendant occupied, controlled or was responsible for maintaining the area where plaintiff fell.

Practitioners should note that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to maintain the area outside the boundaries described in the lease.

Case: Kaplan v. New York Mercantile Exch., NY Slip Op 07964 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Construction Law.

Practice point: If a building was constructed in compliance with code specifications and industry standards applicable at the time, the owner is under no legal duty to modify the building thereafter in the wake of changed standards.

Practitioners should note that, for a plaintiff seeking damages for injuries suffered allegedly because of negligent building design, the legal issue is not whether there was a way to construct the building so as to avoid any possibility of persons being hurt; it is whether the building’s design violated safety standards in effect at the time it was built.

Case: Hotaling v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 07951 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Labor Law.

Practice point: Owners of one-family and two-family dwellings are exempt from statutory liability, pursuant to Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, if they contract for, but do not direct or control, work performed on their property.

Practitioners should note that, although the homeowner exemption does not apply where a one-family dwelling’s owner uses it exclusively for commercial purposes, the fact that there is a home office does not deprive an apartment of its essentially residential character.

Case: DeSabato v. 674 Carroll St. Corp., NY Slip Op 07856 (2d Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Trusts and Estates Law.

Practice point: As a fiduciary, a trustee bears the duty of complete loyalty to the trust’s beneficiaries, regardless of the fact that the settlor's directions give the trustee a free hand.

Practitioners should note that a trustee is liable for a breach committed in bad faith, intentionally, or with reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries.

Case: Boles v. Lanham, NY Slip Op 07848 (2d Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Notice of Claim.

Practice point: On a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e[2], a defendant meets its burden by establishing that plaintiff failed to correctly identify the accident location.

Practitioners should note, however, that a court may, in its discretion, allow a mistaken notice of claim to be corrected as long as the mistake was made in good faith and the public corporation was not prejudiced thereby, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e[6].

Case: Ming v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 07223 (2d Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.

Labor Law.

Practice point: For purposes of a § 241(6) claim based on an accident on a loading dock, plaintiff’s reliance on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1[a][1] is unavailing inasmuch as it specifically refers to a "passageway, walkway, stairway, or other thoroughfare."

Practitioners should note that a freight elevator is not a "material hoist" within the meaning of the Industrial Code at 12 NYCRR 23-6.1(d), 6.3(e)(3); 23-1.4[33].

Case: Barrios v. Boston Props. LLC, NY Slip Op 07579 (1st Dept. 2008)

The opinion is here.