In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. However, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions are not entitled to any such consideration. Although inartfully pleaded, a claim should not be dismissed when the facts stated are sufficient to make out a cause of action. Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims plays no part in the determination of a motion to dismiss. In other words, whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish his allegations is not part of the calculus. Moreover, New York's pleading standard is embodied in CPLR 3013, which provides that "[s]tatements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense." Absent a statutory heightened pleading requirement, New York courts apply the liberal notice pleading standard of CPLR 3013 when construing the pleading sufficiency of federal causes of action, not federal pleading standards.
Pressley v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 06563 (2d Dep't December 24, 2024)
