The elevator's here and it's safe to get on.
The First Department dismissed a complaint seeking damages allegedly suffered when plaintiff tripped and fell while exiting an elevator at work, in Cortes v. Central Elevator, Inc., which was decided on November 8, 2007. The court found that defendant offered submissions sufficient to establish that the elevator was working properly and that there was no misleveling problem on the day of the accident. Among other things, the court pointed to plaintiff's deposition testimony that he did not see the elevator in a misleveled state after his fall, and an affidavit from an elevator consultant who inspected the elevator and concluded that its doors would not have opened if the elevator was more than one-half inch below the hallway floor.
The court noted that plaintiff's expert's affidavit was conclusory and unsupported by the anything in the record. The court gave short shrift to plaintiff's res ipsa argument, noting that the accident could have occurred in the absence of negligence and could have been caused by a misstep on plaintiff's part.
In light of its determination, plaintiff's cross-motion to compel production of post-accident maintenance records was academic, but, the court opined that it was improper because neither control nor defective manufacture were at issue.
November 13, 2007
No on discrimation and harassment, but yes on retaliation.
The First Department dismissed plaintiff's sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims, in Clayton v. Best Buy, which was decided on November 8, 2007, noting that, under the New York Human Rights Law, an employer is not liable for an employee's act of discrimination unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.
The court found that when plaintiff reported the incident, defendant immediately took action, reprimanding the offending employee on the same day the incident occurred and warning him that another similar incident would result in his dismissal. Furthermore, the court said there was no evidence that plaintiff's workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment.
The court also found that plaintiff's allegations of sexual and inappropriate remarks made by various employees of defendant were insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
However, the court did find an issue of fact on the retaliation cause of action, in which plaintiff claimed that defendant had reduced her hours, saying that business had slowed, even though she was considered a good employee and no other cashiers' hours were reduced.
The First Department dismissed plaintiff's sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims, in Clayton v. Best Buy, which was decided on November 8, 2007, noting that, under the New York Human Rights Law, an employer is not liable for an employee's act of discrimination unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it.
The court found that when plaintiff reported the incident, defendant immediately took action, reprimanding the offending employee on the same day the incident occurred and warning him that another similar incident would result in his dismissal. Furthermore, the court said there was no evidence that plaintiff's workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment.
The court also found that plaintiff's allegations of sexual and inappropriate remarks made by various employees of defendant were insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
However, the court did find an issue of fact on the retaliation cause of action, in which plaintiff claimed that defendant had reduced her hours, saying that business had slowed, even though she was considered a good employee and no other cashiers' hours were reduced.
November 12, 2007
The courts are closed for Veterans Day but the law office is open and so we are posting.
Of course, best wishes to my fellow Vietnam veterans and to the women and men whose service has kept us free.
Staying put.
In this action for personal injuries and wrongful death, the First Department denied third-party defendant's motion to change venue from Bronx to Westchester, in Bakiriddin v. Idi Construction, which was decided on November 8, 2007.
Plaintiff's decedent, who was third-party defendant's employee, was injured at a construction site in New York County and was taken to a hospital in New York
County, where he remained for two months. He then was moved to a nursing home in Bronx County, where he died eight months later after being in a comatose state for most, if not all, of his stay there.
Plaintiff was appointed administrator in Bronx County, and venue was placed there pursuant to CPLR 503[b]. The pleading filed in Bronx Surrogate's Court gave plaintiff's address in Westchester, but it also indicated, as reflected in the death certificate, decedent's residence and place of death as Bronx County. The court said that, absent evidence that plaintiff's application for testamentary letters fraudulently misrepresented or withheld facts pertaining to decedent's domicile, a collateral attack on the Bronx County Surrogate's appointment of plaintiff is foreclosed, pursuant to SCPA 204 and 205[1].
The court also noted that third-party defendant did not follow the procedures of CPLR 511, namely, a timely motion following a demand for change of venue, and so a change of venue, based on the location of its principal place of business in Westchester County, is not owing as of right. Finally, the court said it could not grant a discretionary change of venue since third-party defendant did not identify any nonparty material witnesses whose convenience would be served by the change, as required by CPLR 510[3].
Of course, best wishes to my fellow Vietnam veterans and to the women and men whose service has kept us free.
Staying put.
In this action for personal injuries and wrongful death, the First Department denied third-party defendant's motion to change venue from Bronx to Westchester, in Bakiriddin v. Idi Construction, which was decided on November 8, 2007.
Plaintiff's decedent, who was third-party defendant's employee, was injured at a construction site in New York County and was taken to a hospital in New York
County, where he remained for two months. He then was moved to a nursing home in Bronx County, where he died eight months later after being in a comatose state for most, if not all, of his stay there.
Plaintiff was appointed administrator in Bronx County, and venue was placed there pursuant to CPLR 503[b]. The pleading filed in Bronx Surrogate's Court gave plaintiff's address in Westchester, but it also indicated, as reflected in the death certificate, decedent's residence and place of death as Bronx County. The court said that, absent evidence that plaintiff's application for testamentary letters fraudulently misrepresented or withheld facts pertaining to decedent's domicile, a collateral attack on the Bronx County Surrogate's appointment of plaintiff is foreclosed, pursuant to SCPA 204 and 205[1].
The court also noted that third-party defendant did not follow the procedures of CPLR 511, namely, a timely motion following a demand for change of venue, and so a change of venue, based on the location of its principal place of business in Westchester County, is not owing as of right. Finally, the court said it could not grant a discretionary change of venue since third-party defendant did not identify any nonparty material witnesses whose convenience would be served by the change, as required by CPLR 510[3].
November 9, 2007
Untimely service of a summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for alleged discrimination on the basis of his sexual orientation. Plaintiff filed a note of issue on May 15, 2006, and motions for summary judgment, if any, were to be made within 60 days thereafter, pursuant to a preliminary conference order.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was untimely served but Supreme Court accepted counsel's excuse that she had mistakenly thought she had 120 days, not 60, and granted the motion on the merits.
The First Department reversed, in Crawford v. Liz Claiborne, which was decided on November 1, 2007. The court noted that a court will get to the merits of an untimely summary judgment motion only if movant demonstrates a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness. Here, the court found defendants' explanation nothing more than a perfunctory claim of law office failure, which is insufficient to constitute good cause under CPLR 3212(a).
The court gave short shrift to the argument that the motion was untimely by just five days, saying that it does not defeat the requirement of a good cause for the delay.
There was a lengthy dissent in which two judges cited what they thought was ambiguity created by the motion court's referring to a local rule in its preliminary conference order. The dissenters also took sharp exception to the court's remitting the matter for reassignment to another judge, finding this a wholly unnecessary impugning of the motion court.
Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for alleged discrimination on the basis of his sexual orientation. Plaintiff filed a note of issue on May 15, 2006, and motions for summary judgment, if any, were to be made within 60 days thereafter, pursuant to a preliminary conference order.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was untimely served but Supreme Court accepted counsel's excuse that she had mistakenly thought she had 120 days, not 60, and granted the motion on the merits.
The First Department reversed, in Crawford v. Liz Claiborne, which was decided on November 1, 2007. The court noted that a court will get to the merits of an untimely summary judgment motion only if movant demonstrates a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness. Here, the court found defendants' explanation nothing more than a perfunctory claim of law office failure, which is insufficient to constitute good cause under CPLR 3212(a).
The court gave short shrift to the argument that the motion was untimely by just five days, saying that it does not defeat the requirement of a good cause for the delay.
There was a lengthy dissent in which two judges cited what they thought was ambiguity created by the motion court's referring to a local rule in its preliminary conference order. The dissenters also took sharp exception to the court's remitting the matter for reassignment to another judge, finding this a wholly unnecessary impugning of the motion court.
November 8, 2007
Failure to prosecute (or to explain).
In this medical malpractice action, the First Department granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, in Patterson v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital, which was decided on November 1, 2007.
Plaintiff did not respond to defendants' disclosure demands served at about the same time as their answer, and had otherwise been utterly inactive when, two years later, defendants served a CPLR 3216 notice. Service of the notice required that plaintiff do one of three things: (1) file a note of issue within 90 days; (2) move to vacate the notice or extend the 90-day period; or (3) oppose the motion to dismiss, demonstrating the action's merit and proferring an excuse for the delay sufficient to convince the court to forgive the failure to prosecute as a matter of its inherent discretion.
Plaintiff chose the third alternative, submitting materials responsive to plaintiff's discovery demands, but offering no excuse whatsoever for the inactivity and, with respect to the merits, merely promising to produce an expert's affidavit within 60 days of the motion's return day. The court found it was way too little and way too late.
In this medical malpractice action, the First Department granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, in Patterson v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital, which was decided on November 1, 2007.
Plaintiff did not respond to defendants' disclosure demands served at about the same time as their answer, and had otherwise been utterly inactive when, two years later, defendants served a CPLR 3216 notice. Service of the notice required that plaintiff do one of three things: (1) file a note of issue within 90 days; (2) move to vacate the notice or extend the 90-day period; or (3) oppose the motion to dismiss, demonstrating the action's merit and proferring an excuse for the delay sufficient to convince the court to forgive the failure to prosecute as a matter of its inherent discretion.
Plaintiff chose the third alternative, submitting materials responsive to plaintiff's discovery demands, but offering no excuse whatsoever for the inactivity and, with respect to the merits, merely promising to produce an expert's affidavit within 60 days of the motion's return day. The court found it was way too little and way too late.
November 7, 2007
Malicious prosecution.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant-apartments and, in that capacity, did some maintenance work in individual defendant's unit. Afterward, individual defendant noticed that two watches and a pair of sun glasses were missing, and he reported the loss to the apartment's security director, who notified police. Plaintiff was later arrested and charged with petit larceny, and given an appearance ticket.
Plaintiff then left a threatening message on individual defendant's telephone answering machine, and plaintiff was arrested again, charged with aggravated harassment.
Both charges were dismissed on speedy trial grounds, pursuant to CPL 30.30, and plaintiff commenced this civil action, alleging, among other things, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Supreme Court granted apartment-defendant's motion to dismiss, but did not dismiss the malicious prosecution cause of action as against individual defendant and the City. The Second Department reversed, in Baker v. City of New York,which was decided on October 30, 2007.
The court noted that, in order to recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish all four necessary elements, namely, (1) that a criminal proceeding was commenced; (2) that it was terminated in favor of the accused; (3) that it lacked probable cause; and (4) that the proceeding was brought out of actual malice.
The court then found that individual defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the element of actual malice, saying, that, generally, a civilian who merely furnishes information to law enforcement authorities who are then free to exercise their own independent judgment as to whether an arrest will be made and criminal charges filed will not be held liable for malicious prosecution. Here, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether individual defendant had played an active role in the prosecution of the charges by advising the police or by encouraging them to make the arrests. Plaintiff did not even allege that individual defendant knowingly gave false information to the police, and he did not allege anything which would raise a question of actual malice.
The court also found individual defendant entitled to summary judgment on the element of probable cause, which here required only information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that plaintiff had committed an offense.
The court also found the City entitled to summary judgment on the same elements, noting that information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant-apartments and, in that capacity, did some maintenance work in individual defendant's unit. Afterward, individual defendant noticed that two watches and a pair of sun glasses were missing, and he reported the loss to the apartment's security director, who notified police. Plaintiff was later arrested and charged with petit larceny, and given an appearance ticket.
Plaintiff then left a threatening message on individual defendant's telephone answering machine, and plaintiff was arrested again, charged with aggravated harassment.
Both charges were dismissed on speedy trial grounds, pursuant to CPL 30.30, and plaintiff commenced this civil action, alleging, among other things, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Supreme Court granted apartment-defendant's motion to dismiss, but did not dismiss the malicious prosecution cause of action as against individual defendant and the City. The Second Department reversed, in Baker v. City of New York,which was decided on October 30, 2007.
The court noted that, in order to recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish all four necessary elements, namely, (1) that a criminal proceeding was commenced; (2) that it was terminated in favor of the accused; (3) that it lacked probable cause; and (4) that the proceeding was brought out of actual malice.
The court then found that individual defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the element of actual malice, saying, that, generally, a civilian who merely furnishes information to law enforcement authorities who are then free to exercise their own independent judgment as to whether an arrest will be made and criminal charges filed will not be held liable for malicious prosecution. Here, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether individual defendant had played an active role in the prosecution of the charges by advising the police or by encouraging them to make the arrests. Plaintiff did not even allege that individual defendant knowingly gave false information to the police, and he did not allege anything which would raise a question of actual malice.
The court also found individual defendant entitled to summary judgment on the element of probable cause, which here required only information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that plaintiff had committed an offense.
The court also found the City entitled to summary judgment on the same elements, noting that information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest.
November 6, 2007
The courts are closed on this election day, but the law office is open and so we're posting a case.
Housing matters.
The First Department upheld the City agency's granting of a certificate of eviction on the ground that the apartment at issue was not petitioner-tenant's primary residence, in Kaufman v. New York City Housing Preservation and Development, which was decided on November 1, 2007. The court found in the record the requisite substantial evidence, including petitioner's failure to file income statements, hearing testimony, albeit largely hearsay, and petitioner's failure to testify on her own behalf. The court also noted that the issue of succession rights was not raised at the administrative level and so was not properly before the court as a matter for judicial review.
Housing matters.
The First Department upheld the City agency's granting of a certificate of eviction on the ground that the apartment at issue was not petitioner-tenant's primary residence, in Kaufman v. New York City Housing Preservation and Development, which was decided on November 1, 2007. The court found in the record the requisite substantial evidence, including petitioner's failure to file income statements, hearing testimony, albeit largely hearsay, and petitioner's failure to testify on her own behalf. The court also noted that the issue of succession rights was not raised at the administrative level and so was not properly before the court as a matter for judicial review.
November 5, 2007
Assumption of the risk not in play.
Plaintiff was an experienced lifeguard who enrolled in a recertification CPR course which included lectures and demonstrations of CPR and rescue breathing techniques. Plaintiff alleges that, during the class, he was used to demonstrate the "head-tilt, chin-lift" technique, which is a method of clearing an unconscious person's airway. Plaintiff claims that demonstration was done in a negligent and reckless manner, thereby causing injury to his neck.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by participating in the class. The Second Department denied defendant's motion and reinstated the complaint, in Schoenlank v. Yonkers YMCA, which was decided on October 23, 2007.
The court noted that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk precludes a voluntary participant in a sport or recreational activity from recovering for those injuries that may foreseeably result from the realization of a risk inherent in the activity itself. The doctrine can also apply in the context of nonsporting activities which pose inherent risks to the participants, as long as participation was voluntary and the injured participant had been fully apprised of the risks involved.
The court said that, here, defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the "head-tilt, chin-lift" technique, when properly done, involved any inherent risk of injury to the person on whom it is performed, and that, therefore, they failed to establish that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk was even implicated.
The court that, in any event, even if plaintiff had assumed some degree of risk by allowing the technique to be performed on him, the law is clear that a participant does not assume the risk of another participant's negligent act which enhances the risk of injury. On these facts, the court found unresolved issues of fact as to whether the alleged application of forceful and excessive pressure and torque to the plaintiff's head and neck for a period of approximately 20 seconds was negligent and enhanced the risk of injury to plaintiff.
Plaintiff was an experienced lifeguard who enrolled in a recertification CPR course which included lectures and demonstrations of CPR and rescue breathing techniques. Plaintiff alleges that, during the class, he was used to demonstrate the "head-tilt, chin-lift" technique, which is a method of clearing an unconscious person's airway. Plaintiff claims that demonstration was done in a negligent and reckless manner, thereby causing injury to his neck.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by participating in the class. The Second Department denied defendant's motion and reinstated the complaint, in Schoenlank v. Yonkers YMCA, which was decided on October 23, 2007.
The court noted that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk precludes a voluntary participant in a sport or recreational activity from recovering for those injuries that may foreseeably result from the realization of a risk inherent in the activity itself. The doctrine can also apply in the context of nonsporting activities which pose inherent risks to the participants, as long as participation was voluntary and the injured participant had been fully apprised of the risks involved.
The court said that, here, defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the "head-tilt, chin-lift" technique, when properly done, involved any inherent risk of injury to the person on whom it is performed, and that, therefore, they failed to establish that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk was even implicated.
The court that, in any event, even if plaintiff had assumed some degree of risk by allowing the technique to be performed on him, the law is clear that a participant does not assume the risk of another participant's negligent act which enhances the risk of injury. On these facts, the court found unresolved issues of fact as to whether the alleged application of forceful and excessive pressure and torque to the plaintiff's head and neck for a period of approximately 20 seconds was negligent and enhanced the risk of injury to plaintiff.
November 2, 2007
Municipal immunity.
The First Department dismissed the complaint as against the City, on the grounds of municipal immunity, in Shands v. Escalona, which was decided on October 23, 2007. Plaintiff had alleged that her intended roadside exit was closed because of flooding, and that a City police officer was negligent when he guided her back onto the highway, only to have her vehicle struck by a tractor-trailer owned and operated by co-defendants.
The court said that, even accepting plaintiff's allegations as true, any negligence on the part of the officer was committed in the course of a discretionary act for which the City is immune from suit, absent a special relationship. On these facts, the court did not find evidence of the requisite relationship.
The First Department dismissed the complaint as against the City, on the grounds of municipal immunity, in Shands v. Escalona, which was decided on October 23, 2007. Plaintiff had alleged that her intended roadside exit was closed because of flooding, and that a City police officer was negligent when he guided her back onto the highway, only to have her vehicle struck by a tractor-trailer owned and operated by co-defendants.
The court said that, even accepting plaintiff's allegations as true, any negligence on the part of the officer was committed in the course of a discretionary act for which the City is immune from suit, absent a special relationship. On these facts, the court did not find evidence of the requisite relationship.
November 1, 2007
A motion to preclude denied.
The Second Department affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to preclude one of defendants' medical experts from testifying on the ground that his testimony varied from the expert witness statement served before trial, pursuant to CPLR 3101[d][1][i], in Popkave v. Ramapo Radiology, which was decided on October 23, 2007.
On review of the trial record, the court found that the expert's testimony was fully consistent with his pretrial disclosure statement. The court said that any additional testimony the witness gave regarding the plaintiff's social history and the causes of breast cancer either was of collateral significance or constituted general background information, which did not render the pretrial disclosure statement inadequate or misleading, and did not result in prejudice or surprise to plaintiff.
The Second Department affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to preclude one of defendants' medical experts from testifying on the ground that his testimony varied from the expert witness statement served before trial, pursuant to CPLR 3101[d][1][i], in Popkave v. Ramapo Radiology, which was decided on October 23, 2007.
On review of the trial record, the court found that the expert's testimony was fully consistent with his pretrial disclosure statement. The court said that any additional testimony the witness gave regarding the plaintiff's social history and the causes of breast cancer either was of collateral significance or constituted general background information, which did not render the pretrial disclosure statement inadequate or misleading, and did not result in prejudice or surprise to plaintiff.
October 31, 2007
It was in the mail.
The Second Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that it was untimely served, in Ortega v. Trefz, which was decided on October 23, 2007. The court noted that service on a party's attorney by mail is complete upon mailing, pursuant to CPLR 2103[b][2]. The court went on to explain that "mailing" means the deposit of a paper enclosed in a first class postpaid wrapper, addressed to the address designated by a person for that purpose or, if none is designated, at that person's last known address, in a post office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the state, pursuant to CPLR 2103[f][1].
Furthermore, said the court, a properly executed affidavit of service raises a presumption that there was a proper mailing.
Here, defendants submitted a notarized affidavit of service from an employee of defendants' counsel attesting that she mailed the motion papers on May 9, 2006, in strict adherence to the statutory requirement. The postmark date of May 10, on the envelope in which the plaintiffs received the motion, did not establish that service was not completed on May 9.
The Second Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that it was untimely served, in Ortega v. Trefz, which was decided on October 23, 2007. The court noted that service on a party's attorney by mail is complete upon mailing, pursuant to CPLR 2103[b][2]. The court went on to explain that "mailing" means the deposit of a paper enclosed in a first class postpaid wrapper, addressed to the address designated by a person for that purpose or, if none is designated, at that person's last known address, in a post office or official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the state, pursuant to CPLR 2103[f][1].
Furthermore, said the court, a properly executed affidavit of service raises a presumption that there was a proper mailing.
Here, defendants submitted a notarized affidavit of service from an employee of defendants' counsel attesting that she mailed the motion papers on May 9, 2006, in strict adherence to the statutory requirement. The postmark date of May 10, on the envelope in which the plaintiffs received the motion, did not establish that service was not completed on May 9.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)