Terminating the employment of a probationary teacher.

Practice point:  A board of education has the right to terminate the employment of a probationary teacher or principal at any time and for any reason, unless the teacher or principal establishes that the termination was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith.

Case:  Matter of Palmore v. Board of Educ. of Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., NY Slip Op 08973 (2d Dep't December 30, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  A Labor Law 241(6) claim.

A summary judgment motion in a case involving an insurance contract or policy.

Practice point:  On the motion, the evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the insured has the burden of showing that the contract covers the loss for which the claim is made.  The applicable standard holds that the insurer has a duty to defend when (1) the allegations in the complaint in the underlying action, construed liberally, suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage, or (2) where the insurer has actual knowledge of facts establishing such a reasonable possibility.  Any .contractual exclusion from coverage must be specific and clear in order to be enforced.

Case:  City of New York v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., NY Slip Op 08932 (1st Dep't December 29, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Terminating the employment of a probationary teacher.

An insufficient motion to strike an answer.

Practice point:  The trial court improvidently exercises its discretion in granting the motion in the absence of a finding that the nonmovant's behavior was willful, contumacious, or due to bad faith, and it will be reversed.

Case:  Haynes v. City of New York, Slip Op 08930 (1st Dep't December 29, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A summary judgment motion in a case involving an insurance contract or policy.

The presumption of proper service.

Ordinarily, a process server's affidavit of service establishes a prima facie case as to the method of service and, therefore, gives rise to a presumption of proper service.  When a defendant submits a sworn denial of receipt of service containing specific facts to refute the statements in the process server's affidavit, the prima facie showing is rebutted and the plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing.  A hearing is not required where the defendant fails to swear to specific facts to rebut the statements in the process server's affidavit.

Case:  Emigrant Bank v. Ramasir, NY Slip Op 08503 (2d Dep't December 21, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  An insufficient motion to strike an answer.

Court holiday.

Suspension of snow removal servces for failure to pay maintenance fees.

The plaintiff alleges that while he was working for nonparty UPS and delivering a package to the home of the defendant Sorrentino, he was injured when he slipped and fell on snow and ice in defendant's driveway. At the time of the accident, Sorrentino lived in a gated community governed by the defendant Stone Hill.  Prior to the time of the accident, Stone Hill had suspended Sorrentino's snow removal services for the property, as a result of the nonpayment of maintenance fees to Stone Hill. The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against Sorrentino and Stone Hill to recover damages for personal injuries. Stone Hill moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and Sorrentino's cross claim. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division reversed.

Stone Hill failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that Sorrentino's nonpayment of the maintenance fees relieved it of its duty to perform snow removal services on the property on the date of the accident, as was its responsibility under the "Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions, Easements, Charges and Liens," which governed the relationship between Sorrentino, as a property owner, and Stone Hill.

Student note:  Since Stone Hill failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff or Sorrentino to raise a triable issue of fact.

Case:  Coons v. Sorrentino, NY Slip Op 08501 (2d Dep't December 21, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tuesday's issue:  The presumption of proper service.

A defendant's summary judgment motion in a trip-and-fall action.

Practice point:  The movant may establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that (1) it neither created the hazardous condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries, nor had actual or constructive notice of that condition for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it, or (2) plaintiff cannot identify the cause of the accident. Here, the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiff was unaware of the location of his fall or what caused him to fall. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted a transcript of the plaintiff's deposition. In that deposition, the plaintiff clearly identified, through photographs, the location of his fall and the condition that allegedly caused it. Any conflicts between the plaintiff's original deposition and the errata sheets raised issues of credibility inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.

Student note:  As the defendants' failed to meet their prima facie burden, their motion will be denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's papers in opposition.

Case:  Belton v. Gemstone HQ Realty Assoc., LLC, NY Slip Op 08491 (2d Dep't December 21, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Suspension of snow removal services for failure to pay maintenance fees.

CPLR 3212(f).

Practice point:  The statute permits a court to deny a motion for summary judgment where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion exist but cannot then be stated. This is especially so where the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure.

Case:  Brielmeier v. Leal, NY Slip Op 08344 (2d Dep't December 14, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: A defendant's summary judgment motion in a trip-and-fall action.

Termination of an action within the meaning of CPLR 203(e), and punitive damages.

CPLR 203(e), in pertinent part, states that "[w]here a defendant has served an answer containing a defense or counterclaim and the action is terminated . . . by dismissal . . . , the time which elapsed between the commencement and termination of the action is not a part of the time within which an action must be commenced to recover upon the claim in the defense or counterclaim."

For statutory purposes, a prior action terminates when a nondiscretionary appeal, or an appeal taken as of right, is exhausted.

A demand for punitive damages will be struck where the action involves a private dispute, and plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants' conduct was aimed at the public generally.

Case: Britt v. Nestor, NY Slip Op 08437 (1st Dep't December 15, 2017)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  CPLR 3212(f).

Court holiday.

Wheel stops and liabiity.

While a landowner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner, there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that is not inherently dangerous. As a matter of law, a clearly visible wheel stop or concrete parking lot divider presents no unreasonable risk of harm,

Case:  Bogaty v. Bluestone Realty NY, Inc., NY Slip Op 08343 (2d Dep't December 14, 2916)

Here is the decision.

Tuesday's issue:  Termination of an action within the meaning of CPLR 203(e), and punitive damages.