A municipality's liability based on a special duty owed to an injured plaintiff.

Practice point:  When a municipality provides ambulance service by emergency medical technicians in response to a 911 call for assistance, it performs a governmental function and cannot be held liable unless it owed a special duty to the injured party. Such a special duty can arise, as is relevant in this action, where the government entity voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally, or where the municipality voluntarily assumed a special relationship with the plaintiff.

Student note:  A municipality will be held to have voluntarily assumed a duty or special relationship with the plaintiffs where there is: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.

Case:  Holloway v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 05267 (2d Dep't July 27, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  An "error in judgment" charge.

Res judicata and permissive counterclaims.

Practice point:  New York is a permissive counterclaim jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 3011. New York's permissive counterclaim rule may save from the bar of res judicata those claims for separate or different relief that could have been, but were not interposed in the parties' prior action.  However, it does not permit a party to remain silent in the first action and then bring a second one on the basis of a preexisting claim for relief that would impair the rights or interests established in the first action.

Student note:  Under New York's transactional analysis approach to res judicata, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.

Case:  Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Allianz Risk Transfer AG, NY Slip Op 05618 (1st Dep't July 21, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A municipality's liability based on a special duty owed to an injured plaintiff.

Summary judgment in a negligence action.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the motion court's granting of defendants' motion and reinstated the complaint in this action for injuries allegedly sustained when plaintiff's motorcycle came in contact with the rear of a box truck operated by defendant-driver and owned by defendant-owner. Defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter other things, an affidavit from defendant-driver and a number of verified witness statements which presented conflicting evidence as to how the accident occurred, including a statement that the defendants' vehicle "stop[ped] short at [a] green light [and] the motorcycle . . . had no time to stop or maneuver." On this record, defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant-driver was free from fault in the happening of the accident.

Student note:  A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the accident.

Case:  Gonzalez v. Ayala, NY Slip Op 05626 (2d Dep't July 27, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Res judicata and permissive counterclaims.

Summary judgment on a motor vehicle accident claim.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of the motion dismissing plaintiff's claims based on a lack of a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).

Defendant established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury to her cervical spine, lumbar spine, or right knee as a result of the motor vehicle accident at issue. Defendant submitted the affirmed reports of an orthopedist and a neurologist, showing no significant limitations, negative clinical results, and a resolved sprain and contusion. Defendant also submitted a radiologist's affirmed report which found, upon review of the MRI scans, no evidence of any disc bulges or herniations in the spine, no recent or acute posttraumatic or causally related disc changes, and only preexisting degenerative changes in the knee.

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. She provided no medical findings of resulting limitations in use of her spine or right knee, shown by either quantified range of motion testing or by a qualitative assessment of her limitations compared with normal function. Plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon never examined her spine, and, although he performed diagnostic arthroscopic surgery on her right knee, he failed to set forth any findings of limitations in the knee, either before or after the surgery. In the absence of evidence of limitations, the orthopedist's conclusory opinion that the accident caused the right knee injury was also insufficient.

Student note:  The unaffirmed MRI reports, which were the only objective evidence submitted by plaintiff concerning her claims of spinal injury, are inadmissible because they are unsworn, and were not relied upon by defendant's experts.

Case:   Hernandez v Cespedes, NY Slip Op 05662 (1st Dep't July 28, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Summary judgment in a negligence action.

A failed motion to strike an answer.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court, finding that plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's answer and for summary judgment on its complaint should have been denied. Striking a party's pleadings is a drastic sanction that requires a clear showing that the party's conduct was willful and contumacious, and plaintiff failed to make this showing. Instead, the record makes clear that the facts surrounding defendant's failure to appear for deposition are in dispute. Defendant submitted affidavits stating that plaintiff had affirmatively agreed to postpone depositions while the parties tried to discern, among other things, who had signed which agreements. The Appellate Division said that, under these circumstances, there must be a hearing to determine whether defendant's failure to attend the deposition was willful and contumacious,

Student note:  The Appellate Division noted that, in New York, there is a strong preference for deciding matters on the merits.

Case:  CEMD El. Corp. v. Metrotech LLC I, NY Slip Op 05542 (1st Dep't July 14, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Summary judgment on a motor vehicle accident claim.

A court's determination as to child support.

Practice point:  A court is not bound by a party's account of his or her own finances, and where a party's account is not believable, the court is justified in finding a true or potential income higher than that claimed.

Student note:  Courts are afforded considerable discretion in imputing income.

Case:  Elsayed v. Edrees, NY Slip Op 05356 (2d Dep't July 6, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A failed motion to strike an answer.

General Business Law § 349, the statute of limitations, and estoppel.

Practice point:  New York courts apply CPLR 214(2)'s three-year period of limitations for statutory causes of action to General Business Law § 349 claims, and the statute runs from the time when the plaintiff was injured. A defendant is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense to a statutory cause of action where the plaintiff has alleged both the tort that was the basis of the action and later acts of deception that prevented the plaintiff from bringing a timely lawsuit.

Student note:  A cause of action accrues, triggering the statute of limitations, when all of the factual circumstances necessary to establish a right of action have occurred, so that the plaintiff would be entitled to relief.

Case:  Kainer v. Christie's Inc., NY Slip Op 05454 (1st Dep't July 7, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A court's determination as to child support.

A dismissed claim of malicious prosecution.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal, as the record does not support a finding that defendants initiated the criminal proceeding against plaintiff without probable cause and with malice. Instead, the record merely shows that they provided police with information and cooperated with authorities; there is no evidence that defendants affirmatively induced the authorities to act.

Student note: The grand jury indictment of plaintiff raises a rebuttable presumption of probable cause for the drug possession charge.

Case:  Patrick v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., NY Slip Op 05446 (1st Dep't July 7, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  General Business Law § 349, the statute of limitations, and estoppel.

Lack of capacity as a defense.

Practice point:  Absent a judicial declaration of incompetence, a person of unsound mind may sue or be sued in the same way as any other person.

Student note:  A motion to amend to add a defense will be denied if the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law.

Case:  Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., NY Slip Op 05451 (1st Dep't July 7, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A dismissed claim of malicious prosecution.

An exclusionary clause in an insurance contract.

Practice point:  In order to be given effect, an exclusion from coverage must be specific and clear, and any ambiguity in the exclusionary clause must be construed most strongly against the insurer.

Student note:  As with any contract, an unambiguous policy provision must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, and the plain meaning of the policy's language may not be disregarded in order to find an ambiguity where none otherwise exists.

Case:  Cleary v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., NY Slip Op 05355 (2d Dep't July 6, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Lack of capacity as a defense.

A bicyclist, a bus, and an illegally parked vehicle.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss in this action where defendant argues that, although its truck was parked in a no-standing zone at the time of the accident involving plaintiff's bicycle and a bus, its truck was not a proximate cause of the accident. The Appellate Division found issues of fact as to how far the truck was protruding into the lane of travel, whether plaintiff swerved toward the bus in an effort to avoid the truck, and whether plaintiff was forced to jump from his bicycle in order to avoid being slammed into the truck as his bicycle was being dragged by the bus.

Student note:  Since a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the accident was a foreseeable consequence of defendant's illegal parking, summary judgment was properly denied.

Case:  Santana v. MTA Bus Co., NY Slip Op 05450 (1st Dep't July 7, 2016)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  An exclusionary clause in an insurance contract.