Disclosure.

Practice point: "There shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof," pursuant to CPLR 3101[a]).  The words "material and necessary" must be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity.  However, discovery is not unlimited, and the supervision of discovery is generally left to the broad discretion of the trial court.

Student note:  Absent an improvident exercise of the trial court's discretion, its determination will not be disturbed by the Appellate Division.

Case:  Gould v. Decolator, NY Slip Op 06416 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Setting aside the jury's verdict in a medical malpractice action.

Contracts and tort liability in favor of a third party.

Practice point:  A contractual obligation, standing alone, does not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party, excapt (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its duties, launches a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's duties; and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely.

Student note:  Because a finding of negligence must be based on the breach of a duty, a threshold question in tort cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party.

Case:  Cioffi v. Raritan Bldg. Servs. Corp., NY Slip Op 06411 (2d dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Disclosure.

A motion to change venue.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed, and granted defendant's motion, pursuant to CPLR 501, 510, and 511, to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Nassau County.

Plaintiff failed to show that enforcement of the forum selection clause would be unreasonable, unjust, or in contravention public policy, or that the inclusion of the forum selection clause in the agreement was the result of fraud or overreaching.  Moreover, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a trial in Nassau County would be so gravely difficult that, for all practical purposes, he would be deprived of his day in court.

Student note:  A contractual forum selection clause is prima facie valid and enforceable unless it is shown by the challenging party to be unreasonable, unjust, in contravention of public policy, invalid due to fraud or overreaching, or it is shown that a trial in the selected forum would be so gravely difficult that the challenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of its day in court.

Case:  Casale v. Sheepshead Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr., NY Slip Op 06410 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Contracts and tort liability in favor of a third party.

Collateral estoppel as a bar to a convicted defendant's relitigating liability in a civil action.

Practice point:  Where a criminal conviction is based upon facts identical to those in a related civil action, the plaintiff in the civil action can successfully invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the convicted defendant from relitigating the issue of liability.  The party seeking the benefit of estoppel must prove that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the present action.  The party against whom preclusion is sought must demonstrate the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination.

Student note:  The doctrine applies whether the conviction results from a plea or a trial.

Case:  Hartman v. Milbel Enters., Inc., NY Slip Op 06314 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A motion to change venue.

Taking a depositon by remote electronic means.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division determined that the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of plaintiff's cross motion, which was made pursuant to CPLR 3103(a), for a protective order directing that his deposition be conducted by remote electronic means. The Appellate Division found that, in light of the evidence that the plaintiff's applications for a visa to return to the United States had been denied, and the evidence establishing that he presently was ineligible to be admitted to the United States, plaintiff demonstrated that traveling from China to the United States for his deposition or independent medical examination would cause undue hardship.

Student note:  Generally, the deposition of a party should take place within the county where the action is pending, pursuant to CPLR 3110[1]).  There is an exception to this rule if the party demonstrates that examination in that county would cause undue hardship.

Case:  Feng Wang v. A & W Travel, Inc., NY Slip Op 06312 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Collateral estoppel as a bar to a convicted defendant's relitigating liability in a civil action.

A quantum meruit claim is denied.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the motion court and denied that branch of plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the cause of action seeking to recover damages against the defendant bank based on quantum meruit.

Plaintiff construction company entered into a construction contract with the individual defendant who was principal of the defendant owner of a commercial building. Pursuant to the contract, plaintiff was to furnish all material and perform all work necessary to renovate the owner's building for a price of $4,200,000. In order to pay for the work, the owner obtained a construction loan from the bank, which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Pursuant to the agreement between the bank and the owner, the bank disbursed money from the loan directly to plaintiff in installments on proof of completion of certain stages of work, but kept 10% of all such funds to be disbursed to plaintiff when the project was complete.  Under the loan agreement, in the event of the owner's default, the bank was entitled to keep all undisbursed funds from the loan.big

The owner defaulted and the bank commenced an action to foreclose on the property. The project was not completed, and plaintiff commenced this action against the owner and the bank asserting, among other things, a claim sounding in quantum meruit. The owner did not appear in the action.

The Appellate Division determined that plaintiff failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as it failed to submit any evidence of the value of any services it may have performed which were accepted by the bank.  Plaintiff does not dispute that the sum of $416,566.50 represents the amount it was owed for work it performed pursuant to its contract with the owner and prior to any default by the owner, and it does not dispute that it previously received the other 90% of the payment owed for those services.  Plaintiff's evidence that the bank retained the sum of $416,566.50, pursuant to the loan agreement between the bank and the owner, for work performed by the plaintiff prior to the owner's default, is not evidence of the value of any services accepted by the bank. Moreover, the remaining 10% of funds that were to be disbursed to plaintiff pursuant to the loan agreement when the project was complete are also not evidence of the reasonable value of services rendered which were accepted by the bank.

The bank established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the claim as against it through the submission of the construction contract between plaintiff and the owner, which specifically outlined the contractor's work on the project.  In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Student note:  A plaintiff seeking to recover on a cause of action sounding in quantum meruit must demonstrate (1) the performance of services in good faith; (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered; (3) an expectation of compensation therefor; and (4) the reasonable value of the services allegedly rendered.

Case:  Crown Constr. Bldrs. & Project Mgrs. Corp. v. Chavez, NY Slip Op 06310 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Taking a deposition by remote electronic means.

An assault by an intoxicated individual, and leave to amend.

Practice point:   To establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing a complaint alleging an assault by an intoxicated individual, a defendant must establish either that it did not serve alcohol to the plaintiff's assailant while he or she was visibly intoxicated, or that its sale of alcohol to the assailant had no reasonable or practical connection to the assault.

Here, the Appellate Division determined that defendants failed to meet their burden, and affirmed the denial of defendants' motion.  Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by an intoxicated patron at approximately 1:30 a.m. at a bar owned by defendants. In support of their motion, defendants submitted a copy of plaintiff's deposition testimony in which he testified that his assailant was at the bar when he arrived around midnight or 12:30 a.m., and that, upon his arrival, his assailant had a glass in his hand and was visibly intoxicated.

Defendants also submitted the deposition testimony of the defendant who tended bar that night.  He testified that plaintiff's assailant was already in the bar when he started tending bar at 8 p.m., and that he eventually stopped serving the assailant hours later because the assailant was visibly intoxicated.

Student note:  The Appellate Division also affirmed the granting of plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of the Dram Shop Act, codified at General Obligations Law § 11-101. The proposed amendment was neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit, pursuant to CPLR 3025[b].  In addition, there will be no undue prejudice or surprise to the defendants by virtue of the amendment.

Case:  Covert v. Wisla Corp., NY Slip Op 06308 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A quantum meruit claim is denied.

Denial of motiom for summary judgment, with leave to renew.

Practice point:  Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability approximately two months after joinder of issue and prior to the exchange of any discovery.  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion, with leave to renew after depositions of the parties.

Student note:  A party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment, and the opposing party is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party's position may exist but cannot then be stated, pursuant to CPLR 3212[f].

Case:  Brea v. Salvatore, NY Slip 06305 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  An assault by an intoxicated individual, and leave to amend.

A CPLR 1018 motion to substitute a nonparty as plaintiff, and to amend the caption accordingly.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmation the granting of the motion based on plaintiff's submission of evidence that the note at issue was in Nationstar's possession, that the mortgage was assigned to Nationstar after the action was commenced, and that, therefore, Nationstar is the real plaintiff in interest.

Student note:  The determination to substitute or join a party pursuant to CPLR 1018 is within the discretion of the trial court.

Case:  Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Lopa, NY Slip Op 06303 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Denial of motion for summary judgment, with leave to renew.

Doctrine of primary assumption of risk.

Practice point:  Pursuant to the doctrine, a voluntary participant in a sporting or recreational activity consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation.  This includes risks associated with the construction of the playing surface and any open and obvious condition on it. However, participants are not deemed to have assumed the risks of reckless or intentional conduct, or concealed or unreasonably increased risks.

Student note:  Awareness of risk is not to be determined in a vacuum, but, rather, is to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff.

Case:  Brown v. Roosevelt Union Free School Dist., NY Slip Op 06204 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A CPLR 1018 motion to substitute a nonparty as plaintiff, and to amend the caption accordingly.

A FOIL request and redaction.

Practice point:  Petitioner requested documents from the New York City Fire Department, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law.  The Fire Department provided copies of the documents, but with numerous items of information redacted.  After an in camera inspection of unredacted copies, the Supreme Court directed the Department to provide petitioner with legible unredacted copies.

The Appellate Division affirmed, to the extent that it found that the Department failed to articulate a particularized and specific justification for any of the redacted information at issue, except for the residence addresses contained in the subject documents. It found that the Department's conclusory assertions that the redacted information, other than residence addresses, fell within a statutory exemption were insufficient to meet its burden of demonstrating that the requested information was exempt from disclosure.

However, the Appellate Division concluded that disclosure of the residence addresses would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, as under the circumstances of this case, the privacy interests at stake outweigh the public interest in disclosure of that information.  It modified the judgment so as to permit redaction of the residence addresses.

Student note:  Under FOIL, government records are presumptively open for public inspection and copying unless they fall within a statutory exemption specified in Public Officers Law § 87(2).  The exemptions are narrowly construed in order to ensure maximum public access, and the burden rests on the agency to demonstrate that the requested material qualifies for exemption.  To meet its burden, the agency must articulate a particularized and specific justification for nondisclosure.

Case:  Matter of Villalobos v. New York City Fire Dept., NY Slip Op 06249 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Doctrine of primary assumption of risk.