A fall on wet bus steps.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and dismissed this action in which plaintiff allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on the wet steps of defendant's bus as he was exiting its front door. At his deposition, plaintiff stated that it was snowing on the day of the accident, and that "lots of snow [had] accumulated everywhere."

The Appellate Division found that, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that it did not breach any duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances that existed at the time of the accident. Given the inclement weather conditions when the accident occurred, it would be unreasonable to expect defendant to constantly clean the bus steps.

Student note:  A common carrier is subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor, namely, reasonable care under all the circumstances of the particular case.

Case:  Batista v. MTA Bus Co., NY Slip Op 5430 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Contracts and damages for lost profits.

Attorneys' fees and expenses for frivolous conduct.

Practice point: The court is authorized to impose attorneys' fees and expenses upon a party for frivolous conduct that "asserts material factual statements that are false," pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c][3].

Student note:  Rule 130-1.1 does not require a full evidentiary hearing, but states that attorney's fees and costs may be awarded "after a reasonable opportunity to be heard," and that "[t]he form of the hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case," pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[d].

Case:  Martinez v. Carney, NY Slip Op 05573m(1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A fall on wet bus steps.

An action alleging discrimination because of disability.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division reversed the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment on this disability discrimination claim.  The Appellate Division noted that an employer has a duty to move forward to consider accommodation once the need for accommodation is known or requested, pursuant to NYCRR 466.11[j][4], and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and found that  plaintiff's responses to the notice of proposed termination could reasonably have been understood as a request for accommodation, which the Department of Correctional Services rejected by terminating plaintiff's employment based on her inability to return to work within the one year permitted under Civil Service Law § 71.

The Appellate Division concluded that defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they engaged in a good faith interactive process that assessed plaintiff's needs and the reasonableness of her requested accommodation.

Student note:  An employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim pursuant to Executive Law § 296 unless the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the employer duly considered the requested accommodation. The employer cannot present such a record if the employer has not engaged in interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of the employee's request.

Case:  Cohen v. State of New York, NY Slip Op 05147 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Attorneys' fees and expenses for frivolous conduct.

Auto accidents, stop signs, and right-of-way.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of plaintiff's summary judgment motion on liability in this action where plaintiff seeks damages for injuries sustained in an auto accident.Defendant testified that he stopped at an intersection, looked to the direction of oncoming traffic, and observed that plaintiff's vehicle was at a corner one block away. Defendant further testified that he began to move his vehicle because he believed that he had time to cross over the intersection, as plaintiff's vehicle was "at the other corner." He also testified that he blew his horn five seconds before the vehicles collided, and that the impact occurred between the front bumper of his vehicle and the front driver's side of plaintiff's vehicle.

There are issues of fact as to which driver entered the intersection first, which driver had the right-of-way, and whether plaintiff could have exercised reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Student note:  The fact that defendant's approach in the intersection was regulated by a stop sign and no traffic control devices regulated plaintiff's approach is not a basis for awarding plaintiff summary judgment. In addition, even if plaintiff had the right-of-way, she was still obliged to be vigilant for oncoming traffic.

Case:  Parris v. Gonzalez-Martinez, NY Slip Op 05104 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: An action alleging discrimination because of disability.

A municipality's liability for personal injuries, and 911 calls.

Practice point:  A municipality may not be held liable to a person injured by the breach of a duty owed to the general public, such as a duty to provide police protection, fire protection or ambulance services.  When a negligence cause of action is asserted against a municipality, and the municipality's conduct is proprietary in nature, the municipality is subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties. However, if it is determined that a municipality was exercising a governmental function, the municipality may not be held liable unless it owed a special duty to the injured party.

A special duty is a duty to exercise reasonable care toward the plaintiff, and follows from a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity.  To establish a special relationship against a municipality which was exercising a governmental function, a plaintiff must show: (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.

Student note:  A municipality's emergency response system is a textbook example of a governmental, rather than proprietary, function.

Case:  Cockburn v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 05146 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Auto accidents, stop signs, and right-of-way.

An out-of-possession landlord.

Practice point:  Defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when he tripped over a cord while working in a kitchen facility operated by his employer, which is a nonparty.  The premises in which the kitchen was located were leased from defendant pursuant to a lease which had been entered into between the prior owner of the premises and plaintiff's employer.

Defendant submitted a copy of the lease that governed the rental of the premises to plaintiff's employer.  It also submitted an affidavit and the deposition testimony of its property manager. The Appellate Division determined that, taken together, the evidence demonstrated that defendant was an out-of-possession landlord that did not retain control over the premises and was not obligated under the terms of the lease to perform repairs or maintenance.

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. While defendant retained a right to reenter the premises, plaintiff failed to allege in his complaint or bill of particulars that defendant violated any specific statutory provision, or to raise a triable issue of fact as to any such violation. He also failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant assumed a duty to repair the premises by virtue of a course of conduct.

Student note:  An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries that occur on its premises unless the landlord has retained control over the premises and has a duty to maintain or repair the premises imposed by statute or assumed by contract or a course of conduct.

Case:  Byrd v. Brooklyn 46 Realty, LLC, NY Slip Op 05142 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A municipality's liability for personal injuries, and 911 calls.

A fall down a fire-escape.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in this action where plaintiff alleges that the drop-down ladder on defendants' fire escape malfunctioned as he was descending to the street, causing his foot to be trapped and injuring him. Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing of the absence of any defect in the fire escape, or that they lacked constructive notice of the alleged defect. Their manager and superintendent testified that they did not service or test the fire escape prior to plaintiff's accident, and defendants did not produce any inspection reports.

In addition, defendants' contention that plaintiff's use of the fire escape to exit an apartment in a nonemergency situation was unforeseeable and unreasonable presents issues of fact for the jury.

Student note:  As defendants made no showing of inspections of the fire escape before the accident, they failed to show lack of constructive notice as a matter of law, requiring denial of their motion regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff's opposing papers.

Case:  Lombardi v Partnership 92 W., L.P., NY Slip Op 05258 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  An out-of-possession landlord.

The scaffold law.

Practice point:  Labor Law § 240(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents . . . shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected . . . scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to [construction workers employed on the premises]."

This so-called scaffold law protects workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety practices at building construction jobs on the owner and general contractor.

Here, the Appellate Division determined that plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a statutory violation. He submitted evidence demonstrating that, while in the course of his employment as a carpenter on property owned by the State, he was standing on an unsecured A-frame ladder when the ladder tipped over, causing him to fall.

In opposition, the State failed to raise a triable issue of fact, as it only relied upon inadmissible hearsay in support of its contention that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident.

Student note:  As property owner, the State may be liable for the accident even though it did not exercise control or supervision of the work.  To hold the owner liable, a plaintiff must prove that there was a statutory violation and that it was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.

Case:  Casasola v. State of New York, NY Slip Op 04798 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  A fall down a fire-escape.

A motion to dismiss a slip-and-fall action, and open and obvious conditions.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss this action for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff tripped over an extension cord.

The Appellate Division found in the record presents triable issues of fact as to whether defendants created the condition that caused plaintiff's fall. A premises' security manager testified that, after viewing video footage from two days before the accident, he observed defendants' employees working at the location the weekend before the accident. In addition, there are issues of fact as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the extension cord that was on the floor prior to the accident. Defendants never established when their employees last inspected the location prior to the accident, even though their witnesses testified that defendants inspected the area.

Student note:  The fact that the extension cord was bright yellow, the floor was white, and the cord was seen by two nonparty witnesses prior to the accident does not establish that the condition was open and obvious. Plaintiff testified that the accident did not happen until after he passed the portable air conditioning unit, and that the air conditioning unit obscured a view of the extension cord.

Case:  DiMarzo v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams. Inc., NY Slip Op 04924(1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  The scaffold law.

Operating a vehicle with the owner's consent, and leave to amend the complaint.

Practice point:  Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 creates a strong presumption that the driver of a vehicle is operating it with the owner's consent, which can only be rebutted by substantial evidence demonstrating that the vehicle was not operated with the owner's express or implied permission.  The owner's uncontradicted testimony that the vehicle was operated without permission, does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of permissive use. The question of consent is ordinarily one for the jury.

Student note:  Motion for leave to amend should be granted in the absence of a showing that the proposed amendment would prejudice or surprise the defendants, and the proposed amendment was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, CPLR 3025[b].

Case:  Blassberger v. Varela, NY Slip Op 04796 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A motion to dismiss a slip-and-fall action, and open and obvious conditions.

Denial of an Article 78 petition.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the petition to set aside CUNY's determination, dated January 12, 2012, dismissing petitioner from its law school.

The proceeding is untimely as it was commenced on June 25, 2012, more than four months after respondent's final and binding determination, pursuant to CPLR 217[1]).

Student note:  Contrary to petitioner's argument, her subsequent correspondences with respondent did not toll or recommence the statutory period.

Case:  Lopez v. CUNY, NY Slip Op 04927 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Operating a vehicle with the owner's consent, and leave to amend the complaint.