Calculating quantum meruit compensation.

Practice point:  The award of quantum meruit compensation under 22 NYCRR 691.10(b) is not limited to a calculation based on the number of hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, but can also be calculated as a portion of a contingent fee. In either case, the court must weigh the relevant factors, which include evidence of the time and skill required in that case; the matter's complexity; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the client's benefit from the attorney's services; and the fee usually charged by other attorneys for similar services.

Student note:  An award in quantum meruit should reflect the court's assessment of the qualitative value of the services rendered, made after weighing all relevant factors considered in valuing legal services. While not binding or determinative, the court also should consider any compensation agreement between outgoing and incoming counsel.

Case:  Biagioni v. Narrows MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., NY Slip Op 02924 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:   A Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

Freezing rainstorm in progress.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, finding that the undisputed fact that plaintiff's slip and fall occurred during a freezing-rainstorm in progress established prima facie that defendants were not negligent in failing to remove the ice on the sidewalk in front of their building on which plaintiff testified that she slipped .

The record also shows that, on the day of the accident, defendants' maintenance staff followed its regular protocol for clearing newly fallen snow and ice from the sidewalk and the building's entrance area at 6 a.m. and again at 7 a.m., before the start of the school day.  While plaintiff contends that in clearing the sidewalk defendants created a hazardous condition or exacerbated a natural hazard created by the storm, she submitted no evidence to support her contention.

Student note:  Plaintiff did not raise a material fact issue by pointing to the inconsistent testimony of a maintenance worker as to whether salt was used on the sidewalk before plaintiff's fall, as plaintiff failed to explain how using or not using salt could have created or exacerbated the naturally occurring ice condition.

Case:  Sevilla v. Calhoun School, Inc., NY Slip Op 03030 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Calculating quantum meruit compensation.

Enforcing a stipulation.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of plaintiff's motion to enforce the stipulation, which did not contain any provision requiring plaintiff to make payments on the mortgage or water bill. A court may not imply a term where the circumstances of the contract's formation indicate that, when the contract was made, the parties must have foreseen the contingency at issue and the agreement can be enforced according to its terms. Here, the underlying controversy between the parties involved defendant's claim that plaintiff failed to make mortgage and other payments. When the parties entered into the stipulation, they must have foreseen that contingency..

Plaintiff's motion papers established that defendant failed to respond to an offer to purchase the property and, therefore, established that defendant breached the stipulation.  Defendant failed to show that plaintiff breached the stipulation, and did not proffer sufficient cause to invalidate the agreement, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident.

Student note:  A stipulation of settlement is a contract, enforceable according to its terms. When a court enforces a stipulation of settlement, it must effectuate the parties' intent. As with any contract, where the terms of a stipulation of settlement are unambiguous, the Supreme Court must give effect to the parties' intent based upon the plain meaning of the words used by the parties.

Case:  Bethea v. Thousand, NY Slip Op 02923 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Freezing rainstorm in progress.

Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-paint condition.

Practice point:  Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-based paint condition may be established by proof that the landlord (1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs; (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned; (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises; (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children; and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment.

Student note:  Under New York common law, a landowner has a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.   For a landlord to be held liable for injuries resulting from a defective condition upon the premises, the plaintiff must establish that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have been corrected.

Case:  Greene v. Mullen, NY Slip Op 02729 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Enforcing a stipulation.

Leave to amend the complaint to assert malicious prosecution.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to assert a cause of action alleging malicious prosecution.  As the proposed cause of action failed to plead the required element of interference with person or property, it was palpably insufficient.

Student note:  In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit.

Case:  Galanova v. Safir, NY Slip Op 02723 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Constructive notice of a hazardous lead-paint condition.

The arbitrability of a fee dispute.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's conclusion that the plaintiff could not seek de novo review on the merits of an attorney-client fee dispute that was previously submitted for arbitration. Under the terms of the parties' retainer agreement and the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, the plaintiff's election to resolve the fee dispute by arbitration is binding upon both attorney and client, and reviewable pursuant to CPLR article 75.  The Appellate Division found nothing in the record to supports the plaintiff's contention that the parties modified the retainer agreement, or elected to proceed to arbitration in a manner that was inconsistent with the retainer agreement or 22 NYCRR Part 136.

Student note:  A challenge to the confirmation of an arbitration award requires a showing that the arbitrators exceeded their power or so imperfectly executed the arbitration that a final and definite award upon the submitted matter was not made, pursuant to CPLR 7511[b][iii].

Case:  Dermigny v. Harper, NY Slip Op 02721 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Lave to amend the complaint to assert malicious prosecution.

A fall at a bus stop, or not?

Practice point:  Plaintiff was injured when, while disembarking from the rear doors of a bus, she stepped onto an allegedly broken and uneven sidewalk causing her to fall. Located approximately 55 feet west of the location where plaintiff fell is a sign designating a bus stop.  The Appellate Division found a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff fell within a designated bus stop location, and reinstated the complaint as against the City.

The fact that plaintiff believed she did not fall within the bus stop is immaterial since she has no knowledge regarding what the City has designated to be the location of the bus stop. The motion court's reliance on Section 16-124.1(a)(2) of the Administrative Code as limiting a bus stop to "five feet of the sidewalk and the gutter immediately adjacent to the curb," was misplaced. The regulation pertains to the City's responsibility to remove snow and ice adjacent to bus stops, and does not purport to define "bus stop" for all purposes. In addition, the regulation became effective three years after the incident.

Student note:  A bus stop is not delimited to the roadway where buses operate, but includes the sidewalk where passengers board and disembark.

Case:  Bednark v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 02841 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: The arbitrability of a fee dispute.

Contracts, and tort liability to a third party.

Practice point:  Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when he fell through a coal chute cover while exiting his parents' house. Defendant had been hired to perform certain plumbing work in the basement of the house 16 days prior to the accident. Plaintiff alleged defendant's employees failed to properly replace the coal chute cover after removing it to enter the basement.

Defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint on the ground of spoliation of evidence, and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it owed no duty of care to the plaintiff and that there was no evidence that its employees had improperly replaced the coal chute cover. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion which was to strike the complaint on the ground of spoliation of evidence to the extent of precluding plaintiff from offering evidence at trial regarding the condition of the coal chute cover and frame, and also granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

The Appellate Division noted that there are three exceptions to the general rule that a contractual obligation, standing alone, does not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party. One of the exceptions is relevant here, namely,  that a party who enters into a contract to render services may be liable in tort to a third party where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his or her duties, launches a force or instrument of harm. A claim that a contractor exacerbated an existing condition requires some showing that the contractor left the premises in a more dangerous condition than the contractor found them.

Here, defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that it owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.  In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant, in allegedly failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its work, launched a force or instrument of harm. Plaintiff made no showing that defendant left the coal chute in a more dangerous condition than it had found it, and plaintiff testified that after the defendant completed its work, he had walked over the coal chute cover twice a day up until the date of the accident and did not observe anything wrong with it.  Plaintiff's mother similarly testified that she, too, had walked over the coal chute cover, without incident, after the defendant's work was completed. Plaintiff's contention that defendant owed a duty to his parents to warn them about the allegedly deteriorating condition of the coal chute cover is unavailing, as there is nothing to impose a duty of care on a party not in privity of contract with the injured party.

Student note:  In light of the determination with respect to summary judgment, the appellate issue regarding the remaining branch of defendant's motion was rendered academic.

Case:  Berger v. NYCO Plumbing & Heating Corp., NY Slip Op 02716 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A fall at a bus stop, or not?

Summary judgment in a slip and fall action.

Practice point:  The Appellate Division determined that the motion court properly found that defendant made a prima facie showing that there was no dangerous condition in existence when plaintiff slipped and fell, and that it was therefore entitled to summary judgment. In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Plaintiff testified that he slipped on the wet ramp minutes after it had stopped raining, and that he did not see any debris, substances, or other defects on the ramp prior to his attempted ascent.  Mere wetness on a walking surface due to rain does not constitute a dangerous condition. Moreover, there is no evidence that defendant created the condition that caused plaintiff's accident, nor does the record show that defendant had constructive notice of a problem with the ramp.

As to constructive notice, plaintiff's expert report merely described the surface of the ramp as "worn, smooth and polished," concluded that "the wet condition . . . would have made the ramp slippery and dangerous." This conclusion, unsupported by any empirical data obtained by scientific analysis, was insufficient to demonstrate an issue of material fact.

Student note:   A defendant moving for summary judgment in a slip and fall action has the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration that it neither created the dangerous condition,  assuming that the condition existed, nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence.  If a defendant establishes prima facie entitlement to such relief as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to the creation of the defect or notice thereof.

Case:  Ceron v. Yeshiva Univ., NY Slip Op 02680 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  Contracts, and tort liability to a third party.

A defendant's burden on summary judgment.

Practice point:  While the ultimate burden of proof at trial is on the plaintiff, a defendant seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidentiary proof in admissible form. The ultimate burden of proof after trial plays no part in the assessment of whether there are relevant factual issues presented on a motion for summary judgment. A moving defendant does not meet its burden of affirmatively establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by merely pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's case. Instead, it must affirmatively demonstrate the merit of its claim or defense.

Student note  A motion for summary judgment will not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility.

Case:  Collado v. Jiacono, NY Slip Op 02443 (2d Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue:  Summary judgment in a slip and fall action.

Gravity and Labor Law § 240(1).

Practice point:  The Appellate Division determined that the motion court properly rejected the City's argument that § 240(1) was inapplicable, because the rail that struck plaintiff did not fall from a "physically significant elevation differential." The Appellate Division affirmed the motion court's finding that the pile of rails that were stacked two and one-half to three feet high was not de minimis, given the approximately 1500 pound weight of the rail and the amount of force it was capable of generating, even over the course of a relatively short descent. The harm plaintiff suffered was the direct consequence of the application of the force of gravity to the rail that struck plaintiff.

Student note:  In a claim such as this, the essential element to a conclusion that an object requires securing is that it presents a foreseeable elevation risk in light of the work being undertaken.

Case:  Jordan v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 02565 (1st Dept. 2015)

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  A defendant's burden on summary judgment.