Practice point: In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the Appellate Division noted that the defendants were not required to cover all of the floor with mats or
continuously mop up all moisture resulting from the tracked-in rain.
Student note: A general awareness that water might be tracked into a building when
it rains is insufficient to impute to the defendants constructive notice
of the particular dangerous condition.
Case: Aguila v. Fox Hills Partners, LLC, NY Slip Op 08945 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A fall on the stairs, and summary judgment denied.
December 30, 2014
December 29, 2014
Dismissal of Labor Law claims.
Practice Point: The Appellate Division reversed, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety, in this action where plaintiff was injured when he stepped into a hole on the flatbed trailer on which he was working.
Defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the § 200 claims, as the uncontroverted evidence shows that defendants neither supervised or controlled plaintiffs' work, and that they had no actual or constructive notice of the hole in the flatbed trailer.
As for the § 240(1) claim, as plaintiff was working on a flatbed trailer, he was not exposed to any gravity-related risk arising from his work. In fact, there is nothing in the record as to the manner of safety device that should have been provided to plaintiff.
While plaintiffs submitted in their pleadings and bills of particulars at least a dozen specific Industrial Code violations in support of their § 241(6) claim, only two were contested on appeal, and so the remainder are deemed abandoned and dismissed.
Plaintiffs allege a violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(b)(1)(i), which pertains to hazardous openings. However, that regulation has been construed to apply to openings that persons can fall through in their entirety. The hole at issue here does not meet this definition.
Industrial Code § 23-9.2(a) pertains to power-operated equipment. However, the flatbed trailer at issue here is not a piece of power operated equipment, and its attachment to a truck does not transform it into such.
Student note: As a result of the dismissal of the complaint in the entirety, plaintiff's spouse has no derivative claims.
Case: Brown v. New York-Presbyterian HealthCare Sys., Inc., NY Slip Op 08912 (1st Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A slip-and-fall on water in the lobby.
Defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the § 200 claims, as the uncontroverted evidence shows that defendants neither supervised or controlled plaintiffs' work, and that they had no actual or constructive notice of the hole in the flatbed trailer.
As for the § 240(1) claim, as plaintiff was working on a flatbed trailer, he was not exposed to any gravity-related risk arising from his work. In fact, there is nothing in the record as to the manner of safety device that should have been provided to plaintiff.
While plaintiffs submitted in their pleadings and bills of particulars at least a dozen specific Industrial Code violations in support of their § 241(6) claim, only two were contested on appeal, and so the remainder are deemed abandoned and dismissed.
Plaintiffs allege a violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(b)(1)(i), which pertains to hazardous openings. However, that regulation has been construed to apply to openings that persons can fall through in their entirety. The hole at issue here does not meet this definition.
Industrial Code § 23-9.2(a) pertains to power-operated equipment. However, the flatbed trailer at issue here is not a piece of power operated equipment, and its attachment to a truck does not transform it into such.
Student note: As a result of the dismissal of the complaint in the entirety, plaintiff's spouse has no derivative claims.
Case: Brown v. New York-Presbyterian HealthCare Sys., Inc., NY Slip Op 08912 (1st Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A slip-and-fall on water in the lobby.
December 26, 2014
Snow, ice, and a homeowner's liability.
Practice point: Owners of owner-occupied single-family homes are exempt from liability imposed pursuant to section
7-210(b) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York for
negligent failure to remove snow and ice from the abutting public
sidewalk. However, they can be held liable where they, or someone on
their behalf, undertook snow and ice removal efforts which made the
natural conditions more hazardous.
Student note: A property owner that elects to engage in snow removal must act with reasonable care so as to avoid creating a hazardous condition or exacerbating a natural hazard created by a storm.
Case: Arashkovitch v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 08793 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: Dismissal of Labor Law claims.
Student note: A property owner that elects to engage in snow removal must act with reasonable care so as to avoid creating a hazardous condition or exacerbating a natural hazard created by a storm.
Case: Arashkovitch v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 08793 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: Dismissal of Labor Law claims.
December 25, 2014
Court holiday.
The courts are closed to mark Christmas Day.
Tomorrow's issue: Snow, ice, and a homeowner's liability.
Tomorrow's issue: Snow, ice, and a homeowner's liability.
December 24, 2014
Summary judgment in a personal injury action.
Practice point: To prevail on the motion on the issue of liability, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing,
prima facie, not only that the defendant was negligent, but also that he
or she was free from comparative fault.
Student note: The movant bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to such relief, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case.
Case: Anjum v. Bailey, NY Slip Op 08792 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Friday's issue: Snow, ice, and a homeowner's liability.
Student note: The movant bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to such relief, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case.
Case: Anjum v. Bailey, NY Slip Op 08792 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Friday's issue: Snow, ice, and a homeowner's liability.
December 23, 2014
A time-barred claim and equitable estoppel.
Practice point: The Appellate Division determined that plaintiffs' claims for conversion and tortious interference with
contract against the individual defendant, relating to unpaid producer royalties allegedly
due to plaintiffs since 1992, were properly dismissed as time-barred.
Plaintiffs cannot argue that defendant should be equitably estopped from
raising the statute of limitations defense since the issue was not
raised before the motion court. In any event, the argument is unavailing because
plaintiffs rely on the same acts that form the basis of their underlying
claims.
Student note: For equitable estoppel to apply, plaintiffs must establish that defendants' subsequent and specific actions somehow kept them from timely bringing suit.
Case: Stroud Prods. & Enters., Inc v. BMG Music, NY Slip Op 08778 (1st Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Summary judgment in a personal injury action.
Student note: For equitable estoppel to apply, plaintiffs must establish that defendants' subsequent and specific actions somehow kept them from timely bringing suit.
Case: Stroud Prods. & Enters., Inc v. BMG Music, NY Slip Op 08778 (1st Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: Summary judgment in a personal injury action.
December 22, 2014
New York's application of res judicata.
Practice point: New York has adopted the transactional analysis approach in deciding
the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Under this analysis, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising
out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even
if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.
Student note: It is not always clear whether particular claims are part of the same transaction for res judicata purposes. New York uses a pragmatic' test to make this determination, analyzing whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. One linchpin of res judicata is an identity of parties actually litigating successive actions against each other, and the doctrine applies only when a claim between the parties has been previously brought to a final conclusion.
Case: Specialized Realty Servs., LLC v. Maikisch, NY Slip Op 08627 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A time-barred claim and equitable estoppel.
Student note: It is not always clear whether particular claims are part of the same transaction for res judicata purposes. New York uses a pragmatic' test to make this determination, analyzing whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. One linchpin of res judicata is an identity of parties actually litigating successive actions against each other, and the doctrine applies only when a claim between the parties has been previously brought to a final conclusion.
Case: Specialized Realty Servs., LLC v. Maikisch, NY Slip Op 08627 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A time-barred claim and equitable estoppel.
December 19, 2014
A claim for common-law negligence.
Practice point: Even when negligence and injury are both
properly found, the negligent party may be held liable only where the
alleged negligence is a proximate cause of the injury. Generally it is for the jury to determine the issue of causation. However, on a motion for summary judgment,
the court will decide, as a matter of law, whether a prima facie case of negligence has been established.
Student note: The elements of a cause of action alleging common-law negligence are a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and a showing that the breach of that duty constituted a proximate cause of the injury.
Case: Roberson v. Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., NY S.lip Op 08622 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: New York's application of res judicata.
Student note: The elements of a cause of action alleging common-law negligence are a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and a showing that the breach of that duty constituted a proximate cause of the injury.
Case: Roberson v. Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., NY S.lip Op 08622 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Monday's issue: New York's application of res judicata.
December 18, 2014
A physician's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim.
Practice point: The physician-defendant's bare allegations which do not refute the specific
factual allegations in the bill of particulars
are insufficient to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law.
Student note: A physician moving for summary judgment dismissing a complaint alleging medical malpractice must establish, prima facie, either that there was no deviation or departure or that any alleged deviation or departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Case: Reiss v. Sayegh, NY Slip Op 08619 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A claim for common-law negligence.
Student note: A physician moving for summary judgment dismissing a complaint alleging medical malpractice must establish, prima facie, either that there was no deviation or departure or that any alleged deviation or departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Case: Reiss v. Sayegh, NY Slip Op 08619 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A claim for common-law negligence.
December 17, 2014
A collision with an unmarked police car.
Practice point: The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of the municipal defendant's motion for summary judgment in this action involving a collision between an unmarked police vehicle and a taxi.
The police vehicle was an authorized emergency vehicle performing an emergency operation, namely, pursuing a traffic violator, and its operator was authorized to proceed through the red light, once it slowed down, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 101, 114-b), and 1104 [a],[b][2]. In order to hold the municipal defendants liable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer driving the police vehicle acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others, which requires a showing that he has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome.
Here, the officer's uncontroverted testimony was that he came to a complete stop prior to entering the intersection. The fact that he looked in the direction of, but did not see, the approaching taxi did not render his conduct reckless.
Student note: Issues of fact as to whether the police lights were on or whether the siren was activated do not require a different result. A police vehicle performing an emergency operation is not required to activate either of these devices, in order to be entitled to the statutory privilege of passing through a red light, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[c].
Case: Flynn v. Sambuca Taxi, LLC, NY Slip Op 08723 (1st Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A physician's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim.
The police vehicle was an authorized emergency vehicle performing an emergency operation, namely, pursuing a traffic violator, and its operator was authorized to proceed through the red light, once it slowed down, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 101, 114-b), and 1104 [a],[b][2]. In order to hold the municipal defendants liable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer driving the police vehicle acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others, which requires a showing that he has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome.
Here, the officer's uncontroverted testimony was that he came to a complete stop prior to entering the intersection. The fact that he looked in the direction of, but did not see, the approaching taxi did not render his conduct reckless.
Student note: Issues of fact as to whether the police lights were on or whether the siren was activated do not require a different result. A police vehicle performing an emergency operation is not required to activate either of these devices, in order to be entitled to the statutory privilege of passing through a red light, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[c].
Case: Flynn v. Sambuca Taxi, LLC, NY Slip Op 08723 (1st Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A physician's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim.
December 16, 2014
A rear-end collision and a negligence claim.
Practice point: One of several nonnegligent explanations for a rear-end collision may be a sudden stop of the lead vehicle. However, vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing
traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by
the following driver, who is under a duty to maintain a
safe distance between the following car and the car ahead.
Student note: A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the rear vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision.
Case: Le Grand v. Silberstein, NY Slip Op 08608 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A collision with an unmarked police car.
Student note: A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the rear vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision.
Case: Le Grand v. Silberstein, NY Slip Op 08608 (2d Dept. 2014)
Here is the decision.
Tomorrow's issue: A collision with an unmarked police car.
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