December 3, 2013

CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Practice point:  On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.  However, bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the record are not presumed to be true.

Student note: Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on the motion, the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one.  Unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, the motion will not be granted.

Case:  Gersher v. Ejamal, NY Slip Op 07447 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Applicability of the emergency doctrine.

December 2, 2013

"Walk" and "Don't walk."

Practice point:  Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1112, a pedestrian who proceeds across a roadway in the direction of a steady "walk" signal must be given the right of way by traffic.

Student note: A pedestrian who proceeds into a roadway with a "walk" signal, but only partially completes the crossing on the "walk" signal, may proceed to a sidewalk on the flashing or steady "don't walk" signal, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1112[b], [c].

Case:  DiDonna v. Houck, NY Slip Op 97446 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: CPLR 3211(a)(7).

November 29, 2013

A fall from an unsecured ladder.

Practice point:  The plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to liability on the Labor Law § 240 cause of action by establishing that he was injured when he fell from an unsecured ladder that collapsed while he was performing roofing work on the subject construction project. The court found the defendants' contention that summary judgment should have been denied because the plaintiff was the sole witness to his accident unpersuasive, as the plaintiff identified three other witnesses in his response to the defendants' combined discovery demands. In any event, even if the plaintiff had been the sole witness to the accident, summary judgment would not be precluded.

Student note:  The plaintiff satisfied his burden of establishing that he was hired by a contractor and was suffered or permitted to work on the premises, such that he was entitled to the protections of the Labor Law, pursuant to Labor Law § 2[5], [7].

Case: Diaz v. 5-01-5-17 48th Ave., LLC, NY Slip Op 07445 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: "Walk" and "Don't Walk."

November 28, 2013

Court holiday.

The courts are closed to mark Thanksgiving Day.

Thanks to all of you for reading New York Law Notes throughout the year, and
best wishes for a safe and happy Thanksgiving.

Tomorrow's issue: A fall from an unsecured ladder.

stock-graphics-vintage-thanksgiving-postcard-0076

November 27, 2013

An out-of-possession landlord's liability.

Practice point:  An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries occurring on the premises unless it has retained control of the premises, is contractually obligated to perform maintenance and repairs, or is obligated by statute to perform such maintenance and repairs.

Student note: Reservation of a right of entry for inspection and repair may constitute sufficient retention of control to impose liability for injuries caused by a dangerous condition.

Case:  Denermark v. 2587 W. 8th St. Assoc., NY Slip Op 07444 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Friday's issue: A fall from an unsecured ladder.

November 26, 2013

A cause of action for an accounting.

Practice point:  While there was no question as to whether the parties shared a confidential relationship as members of a committed family unit, the complaint failed to allege that the fiduciary relationship necessary to obtain an accounting was created by the plaintiff entrusting to the defendant some money or property with respect to which the defendant was bound to reveal her dealings. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for an accounting, and that cause of action was dismissed.

Student note:  The right to an accounting is premised upon the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship and a breach of the duty imposed by that relationship respecting property in which the party seeking the accounting has an interest.

Case:  Dee v. Rakower, NY Slip Op 07443 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: An out-of-possession landlord's liability.

November 25, 2013

Common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200.

Practice point:  Awareness of unsanitary conditions at the school was insufficient evidence that defendant was on notice of the presence of the fungal pathogen Candida Dubliniensis, the fungus that allegedly caused plaintiff's eye infection. In addition, plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence that the fungus existed at the school at all, other than speculation based on plaintiff's unusual infection.  Finally, there was no evidence that defendant exercised supervision and control over plaintiff's work, so as to impart liability pursuant to Labor Law § 200.

Student note:  A general awareness that a dangerous condition may be present is legally insufficient to charge a defendant with constructive notice.

Case:  Koerner v. City of New York, NY Slip Op 07410 (1st Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: A cause of action for an accounting.

November 22, 2013

Negligent infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort.

Practice point:  This action for negligent infliction of emotional distress arose from defendant newspaper's publication of an article reporting on the death of a three-year old girl who was allegedly beaten by her father.  The article attributed certain statements regarding the child's appearance the day before her death to plaintiff, who was a neighbor. Plaintiff denies making the statements and commenced this action claiming that following the article's publication, a street gang, to which the father and his brother belonged, began to harass and threaten her, causing her to fear for her safety and to change her residence on several occasions.

The complaint failed to state a cause of action as it fails to allege conduct that is extreme and outrageous Plaintiff fails to allege that defendants' conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

Plaintiff similarly failed to properly plead a claim for prima facie tort as the complaint fails to allege that defendants' sole motive in publishing the article was disinterested malevolence, and fails to allege special damages. The complaint merely alleges that plaintiff suffered damages in an amount exceeding the monetary jurisdictional limits of the lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, without specifying or detailing her loss. Although plaintiff's affidavit in opposition stated that she incurred moving expenses in excess of  $15,000, the court held that such a round figure, without itemization, must be considered to represent general damages.

Student note:  Plaintiff was not accorded an opportunity to discover if defendants had knowledge and an intent to injure her, as this addresses only one of the elements of a claim for prima facie tort and cannot cure the defects in the complaint.

Case:  Phillips v. New York Daily News, NY Slip Op 07269 (1st Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Monday's issue: Common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200.

November 20, 2013

The storm in progress rule.

Practice point:  Under the rule, a property owner will not be held responsible for accidents occurring as a result of the accumulation of snow and ice on its premises until an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm.  A person responsible for maintaining property is not under a duty to remove ice and snow until a reasonable time after the cessation of the storm.

Student note: However, once a property owner elects to engage in snow removal activities, the owner must act with reasonable care so as to avoid creating a hazardous condition or exacerbating a natural hazard created by the storm.

Case:  Wei Wen Xie v. Ye Jlang Yong, NY Slip Op 07167 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Negligent infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort.

November 19, 2013

Prior written notice laws.

Practice point:  A municipality that has adopted a prior written notice law cannot be held liable for a defect within the scope of the law absent the requisite written notice, unless an exception to the requirement applies.

Student note:  There are recognized exceptions to the prior written notice requirement where the municipality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence, or where a special use confers a special benefit upon it.

Case:  Keating v. Town of Oyster Bay, NY Slip Op 07157 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue:  The storm in progress rule.

November 18, 2013

An auto accident at an intersection.

Practice point:  The defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the injured plaintiff proceeded into the intersection without yielding the right of way, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a). The evidence submitted by the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the injured plaintiff's failure to properly observe and yield to cross traffic before proceeding into the intersection.  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the defendant's alleged comparative fault.

Student note:  The plaintiffs' contention that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1140 was unavailing, as this section does not apply to intersections, such as the subject intersection, that are controlled by stop signs, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1140[c]. Their argument that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 is speculative, as there was no evidence that the defendant was traveling at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions, and without regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.

Case:  Galvis v. Ravilla, NY Slip Op 07153 (2d Dept. 2013).

Here is the decision.

Tomorrow's issue: Prior written notice laws.